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Abstract 
The bidders in the acquisition market can be divided into two groups, strategic and financial 
acquirers, where the majority of the latter group consists of private equity firms. The two 
groups have different purposes for performing acquisitions. While strategic bidders typically 
intend to acquire targets to incorporate them in their businesses, the incentives of private equity 
firms are more financially driven as their main objective is to generate a return for their 
investors over a relatively short time-horizon. Consequently, different target characteristics 
appeal to the two bidder groups, where one possible explanation for this segmentation is the 
free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen (1989) states that the private equity company has a unique 
ability to mitigate agency costs of free cash flow. If the market is convinced that this is the 
case, private equity firms should be able to make a return by reducing agency costs of free 
cash flow before exiting. Previous literature provides inconsistent evidence concerning 
whether private equity firms acquire targets prone to agency costs of free cash flow, leaving 
unclear interpretations of the relationships proposed by Jensen. We argue that the inconsistent 
evidence in literature could potentially be a consequence of not studying the relationships in a 
way consistent with Jensen’s theory. Hence, we constrain our analysis to public low growth 
firms. Our findings provide robust evidence in line with Jensen’s (1989) hypothesis, indicating 
that private equity companies target firms prone to agency costs of free cash flow.  
 
Furthermore, if private equity companies expect they can obtain a return through mitigation 
of agency costs of free cash flow, we assume this to be reflected in their willingness to pay 
relative to that of the market. However, if the market does not believe that the reduction of 
agency costs of free cash flow is sustainable, the private equity companies should not be able 
to make a return on these targets, and hence the proposed relations might not be present. We 
test this connection by applying the acquisition premium as a proxy for excess willingness to 
pay above the market. While our main analysis provides evidence for this relationship, our 
further research does not show an unambiguous picture. We believe this to be a result of the 
lack of competition in the transactions studied and that consequently, using the acquisition 
premium as a proxy for willingness to pay in excess of the market valuation does not allow us 
to capture the relationship we intend to examine.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the private equity industry has seen a considerable increase in 
investment value, culminating in the highest five-year level ever recorded last year. In 2018, 
the aggregated deal value of the global private equity market increased by 10%, amounting to 
a total of $582 billion (Bain & Company, 2019). At the same time, an ongoing discussion in 
Norway about major corporates and their low return on foreign investments (Langved et al., 
2019) may be related to a continuing relevance of Jensen’s theory about agency costs of free 
cash flow (1986). The free cash flow hypothesis advanced by Jensen (1986) states that, if a 
firm has substantial excess free cash flow, and the interests of the managers are not aligned 
with those of the shareholders, the managers are likely to invest in negative net present value 
projects, rather than distributing excess cash to shareholders.  
In 1989, Jensen followed up on the subject with his paper “The Eclipse of the Public 
Corporation”, stating that private equity companies1, have the ability to solve the main issue 
of public corporations, the principal-agent problem, through their superior organisational 
form. On one hand, the public corporations, particularly those with dispersed ownership, strive 
to align the interests of management and shareholders and might face monitoring costs 
exceeding the individual gain of monitoring. On the contrary, private equity companies are 
supposedly able to mitigate agency costs of free cash flow as a result of the managing partners’ 
extreme sensitivity to the target’s performance, combined with a focus on incentive plans for 
the target managers. In addition to this, the private equity firm typically imposes a high 
leverage on the firms they acquire, resulting in little excess cash left in the target company, 
forcing the managers to run the business efficiently. The combination of the alignment of 
interests and the reduction of cash available for managers to waste, should theoretically result 
in mitigation of agency costs of free cash flow. This advantage is especially valuable when 
acquiring firms with substantial excess free cash flow, and where long-term growth is slow.  
Although Jensen’s (1989) forecast of an eclipse of the public corporation might have been an 
exaggeration, the drastically increasing size of the private equity market combined with the 
 
1The term private equity refers to buyouts (LBOs and MBOs) and venture capital, with the majority of the capital being placed 
in the first group (Krishnaswamy, 2009). We confine our analyses in this thesis to the buyouts, and hereafter refer to them as 
private equity.  
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seemingly continuing importance of agency costs of free cash flow might indicate that the 
costs are severe and that private equity investors do manage to mitigate them. Despite the 
relevance, little attention has, to our knowledge, been paid to the connection between the topics 
of private equity investments and agency costs of free cash flow in recent academia. In 
addition, previous literature on the topic provides varying results.  
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Opler and Titman (1993) provide evidence consistent with the 
relations between the free cash flow hypothesis and private equity firms proposed by Jensen 
(1989). Both studies find that companies acquired by private equity firms have greater 
undistributed free cash flow than companies which did not go private, i.e. companies which 
were not taken over. Additionally, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) find that the undistributed free 
cash flow is an important determinant of premiums paid in these transactions. On the contrary, 
Halpern et al. (1999) do not find support for the relation between private equity firms and the 
free cash flow hypothesis. They perform a similar analysis to the one of Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) and compare the free cash flow of firms acquired by private equity companies to both 
firms which did not go private and to firms acquired by other operating companies.  
It might be that the awareness of the topic has led to changes in the proposed relations. On one 
hand, as just mentioned, we observe cases indicating the presence of agency costs of free cash 
flow in companies today. On the other hand, US public firms are different now compared to 
when Jensen developed his theory (Kahle and Stulz, 2017). There has been a change in the 
focus on governance and control issues in public markets as well as in business in general. In 
addition, the payout rate to shareholders of US firms, defined as dividends plus repurchases, 
has increased substantially the later years. For instance, in most years since the year of 2000, 
US public firms have repurchased more equity than they have issued (Kahle and Stulz, 2017). 
This postulates a contrary view to the continuing occurrence of agency cost of free cash flow, 
indicating that the public companies might have managed to mitigate these agency costs.  
Similarly, the recognition of agency costs of free cash flow might have affected the other 
players in the acquisition market. If private equity firms’ ability to mitigate agency costs of 
free cash flow is in fact a comparative advantage which is not simple to replicate for other 
acquirers, it is plausible that the increased amount of capital allocated to the private equity 
market can partially be explained by this acknowledgement. On the contrary, if the 
comparative advantage is possible to replicate, it might be that the disclosure of the way 
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private equity firms mitigate agency costs of free cash flow has given other acquirers 
opportunity and incentives to implement the same adjustments.  
The inadequate recent literature in the field, combined with indications of the continuing 
occurrence of these agency costs and the large amount of capital allocated to the private equity 
industry, motivates us to further investigate the relationship between private equity firms and 
public corporate targets prone to agency costs of free cash flow. Although we do not study the 
evolution of these relationships, we believe the discussion above indicates the relevance and 
importance of examining the topic further. Our goal is to better understand the relationships 
and the varied evidence in the literature produced to this date. Specifically, we want to test 
whether private equity firms expect they can create value by mitigating agency costs of free 
cash flow for their targets, as proposed by Jensen (1989). The intention of our study is confined 
to the private equity companies’ ex ante calculated exit price, and not the actual long-term 
value creation. We therefore do not consider whether private equity companies are in fact able 
to mitigate agency costs of free cash flow, but rather whether they believe they can obtain a 
return by reducing these costs. Consequently, our research question is:  
Do private equity firms target companies prone to agency costs of free cash flow and do 
agency costs of free cash flow in target companies increase private equity firms’ willingness 
to pay, relative to that of the market?  
We argue that the inconsistent evidence found in previous literature could be a result of 
including both low- and high- growth companies, as well as not comparing the targets acquired 
by private equity firms to the optimal group of comparison. Hence, our paper contributes to 
the literature by focusing only on public low growth targets, as advocated by Jensen (1986). 
We attempt to solve this issue by limiting our sample to the targets with growth below the 
sample median. The free cash flow hypothesis only describes low growth firms with high free 
cash flow, and Jensen (1989) claims that it is for these targets that the organisational form of 
the private equity firm is superior to the public corporation. Hence, we expect that constraining 
our sample to only include low growth firms increases the likelihood of identifying the 
assumed relationship. Further, Lang et al. (1991) reveal that it is important to distinguish 
between low- and high- growth firms as the agency costs of free cash flow is a function of the 
free cash flow for low growth firms, but unrelated to the free cash flow for high growth firms. 
In order to verify that this limitation can be justified, we have checked if our study yields the 
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same results when using the unconstrained sample, consisting of low- and high- growth firms. 
It appears that constraining our sample is important to identify the relations we intend to study.  
Contrary to previous studies, and as a contribution to literature, we analyse the first section of 
our research question by comparing acquisitions made by private equity firms to acquisitions 
made by public strategic bidders. This allows us to test whether characteristics associated with 
being prone to agency costs of free cash flow increases a target’s probability of getting 
acquired by a private equity firm, compared to a public strategic bidder. We believe this choice 
more easily lets us identify the proposed effect as, if Jensen’s theory holds, these two groups 
should be the two with the largest difference when it comes to their handling of targets’ agency 
costs of free cash flow. Additionally, from a methodological point of view, this study 
contributes to literature through an extensive matching procedure which lets us obtain a 
balanced sample of comparable target companies and hence increases the reliability of our 
results. 
We apply a measure of the target’s operating income before depreciations, after distributions 
to stakeholders, as a proxy for the free cash flow available for managers to spend on what the 
shareholders view as suboptimal behaviour. To study the first part of our research question, 
we use our matched sample of low growth firms, comprising of 60 acquisitions made by 
private equity firms and 60 acquisitions made by public strategic companies. We test whether 
a higher value of our measure of target’s free cash flow increases the likelihood of the acquirer 
being a private equity firm relative to a public strategic company. Subsequently, to analyse the 
second part of our research question, we use the acquisition premium as a proxy for excess 
willingness to pay relative to the market2. On a sample of 63 acquisitions made by private 
equity firms, we test whether a higher value of the same measure of target’s free cash flow is 
associated with a higher acquisition premium.  
It should be noted that there might be reasons for the relationships proposed in our research 
question not to hold. It could be that private equity companies’ supposed mitigation of agency 
costs of free cash flow is a short-term effect which is not going to last once the target is sold. 
If both the market and the private equity companies recognise this, neither the exit price, nor 
the deal value, is likely to reflect the elimination of agency costs. Further, another concern is 
 
2 Relying on the assumption that the market’s willingness to pay equals the share price. 
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that applying the acquisition premia as a proxy for excess willingness to pay above the market 
relies on certain assumptions, such as competition and rational bidders, which might not 
necessarily hold.  
Nevertheless, our study supports the relations suggested in our research question, indicating 
that private equity firms do target companies prone to agency costs of free cash flow and that 
their willingness to pay is greater than that of the market for targets prone to these agency 
costs. However, only the examination of the first section seems to be robust in our further 
analyses, and hence we cannot conclude, with a reasonable level of certainty, that the implied 
value creation of private equity firms through mitigation of agency costs of free cash flow is 
reflected in their excess willingness to pay relative to the market. As we will discuss, we 
strongly believe this to be a result of the lack of competition in the transactions studied and 
that consequently, using the acquisition premium as a proxy for excess willingness to pay over 
the market valuation, i.e. the share price, does not allow us to identify the relationship we 
intend to examine. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
In order to explain the rationale behind our hypotheses, this section contains an overview of 
the theory and literature used in this study. We begin by explaining Jensen’s free cash flow 
hypothesis and characteristics of companies prone to agency costs of free cash flow. We then 
continue with an introduction to private equity firms and describe how they should be able to 
mitigate agency costs of free cash flow for their targets. Further, we introduce the different 
players in the acquisition market and their respective purchasing behaviour, before we develop 
our first hypothesis. Lastly, we introduce the concept of applying the acquisition premium as 
a proxy for maximum excess willingness to pay above the market valuation, and establish our 
second hypothesis.  
2.1 Jensen’s Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
Jensen (1986) describes the free cash flow hypothesis as a conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers over payout policies. He states that in companies generating 
substantial free cash flow, defined as cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects 
with positive net present value, motivating managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing 
it below the cost of capital or wasting it on organisational inefficiencies can be a severe 
problem. 
This hypothesis is an extension of the general agency theory which states that agency costs 
arise as a result of the separation between ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
describes agency relationships as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not 
always act in the best interests of the principal”. In other words, when the manager’s goals 
differ from the shareholders’ goals, and the governance and control mechanisms within the 
company are not strong enough, the manager might have incentives to accomplish his own 
goals at the expense of the shareholders. 
Further, for a company to operate efficiently and maximise shareholder value, excess free cash 
flow should be distributed to shareholders by paying out dividends or repurchasing stock, 
rather than retained or invested at a return lower than the cost of capital (Bodie et al., 2018; 
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Hillier, 2013). However, due to the diverging incentives between shareholders and managers, 
excess free cash flow might be invested at a low return, wasted or retained. Studies find that 
one of the reasons shareholders and managers have diverging incentives in terms of payout 
policies is that an increase in executive pay is more related to increases in company size, rather 
than shareholder value (Murphy, 1985; Jensen, 1989). Managers may therefore have 
incentives to maximise firm size by investing at a low return, rather than maximise shareholder 
wealth. For instance, Lang et al. (1991) find that managers of companies with high free cash 
flow and low growth opportunities act sub-optimally when performing acquisitions. Corporate 
growth is also associated with public, social and political prestige and power, and managers’ 
incentives for empire building can lead to wasteful behaviour and low-return investments. 
Accumulation of cash in excess of the optimal level might be comfortable for management, 
but also costly as it ties up capital that yields a low return at a high perceived shareholder risk. 
The pursuance of these "selfish" goals is easier for managers when the firm has excess free 
cash flow (Hillier, 2013) and the costs they impose on shareholders are regarded as “agency 
costs of free cash flow”.  
In a contrary view, it might be that it is not always in the shareholders’ best interest to minimise 
all excess free cash flow in a firm. For instance, in the same way that cost cutting can be a 
short-term solution for improving performance, it is not certain that minimising all “slack” in 
a firm is the optimal strategy in a long-term perspective. With the increase of firms relying on 
human capital rather than physical assets, the importance of, and competition for, the best 
managers and employees might have been rising. It is likely to be the case that employees find 
it more attractive to work in less strict firms. On a short-term perspective, this could impact 
worker motivation, and on a long-term perspective an unattractive workplace is likely to lose 
in the competition for the best employees. Hence, it might not be unambiguous that the 
absolute elimination of excess free cash flow leads to maximisation of shareholder value. 
In the development of the free cash flow hypothesis, Jensen (1986) distinguishes between low 
and high growth firms, and states that it is for firms with low growth that agency costs of free 
cash flow are likely to occur. As firms with growth options have profitable investment 
opportunities, they will be less likely to have the sort of excess cash that Jensen states should 
be paid out. The rationale behind this is that companies which have positive net present value 
options should not give these up to increase or pay dividends to shareholders (Bodie, 2018; 
Hillier, 2013). Hence, excess cash flow before investment expenses for high growth companies 
cannot directly be characterised as waste. Given this argument and the fact that Jensen’s 
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hypothesis only describes low growth companies, we are not in a position to draw conclusions 
about agency costs of free cash flow in high growth companies. Additionally, Lang et al. 
(1991) reveal that agency costs of free cash flow are a function of the free cash flow for low 
growth companies, but unrelated to the free cash flow for high growth companies. Based on 
the discussion above, we expect agency costs of free cash flow to be present particularly in 
public companies where the growth is low and a substantial amount of their free cash flows 
are withheld.  
As agency costs of free cash flow depend on the amount of control exercised by the 
shareholders, it is reasonable to assume that they are more likely to flourish in loosely 
monitored companies and companies with weak corporate governance regimes. Publicly 
traded companies often have a fragmented ownership structure, making it challenging for each 
owner to enforce desired changes and to monitor the company at a reasonable cost. From this 
perspective, publicly traded companies might be particularly prone to agency costs of free 
cash flow. On the other hand, it might be supposed that publicly traded companies, specifically 
the publicly available information about them, are monitored by the market. However, Jensen 
(1989) states that the personal wealth of a typical public company manager has a low 
sensitivity to the company’s share price. We therefore argue that the former argument, i.e. that 
the lack of control could lead to agency problems, should hold in the absence of well designed 
incentive plans, as the power of the market is restricted to adjusting the share price.  
2.2 Private Equity Firms and Mitigation of Agency Problems of 
Free Cash Flow 
Private equity firms were traditionally referred to as leverage buyout associations or LBO 
partnerships (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Ciccotello, 2014). The term private equity often 
refers to buyouts (LBOs and MBOs) and venture capital, with the majority of the capital being 
placed in the first group (Krishnaswamy, 2009). We confine our analyses in this thesis to 
buyout transactions and refer to them as private equity.  
Private equity firms manage assets on behalf of their investors. As their main objective is to 
generate return for their investors, they typically attempt to acquire troubled or undervalued 
companies with a turnaround and exit potential within a time horizon of three to five years 
(Krishnaswamy, 2009). Due to their expertise in restructuring of troubled companies 
(Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014), they can often realise a gain through improving their targets’ 
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performance and profitability before exiting. One of the segments where private equity 
companies are known to have an advantage is in the acquisition market for poorly performing 
targets. To be able to employ the desired changes, they usually acquire a majority stake in the 
firm (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014). Further, the extensive use of debt in private equity 
transactions reduces the amount of equity in a portfolio company and makes concentrated 
ownership possible. This allows the private equity firm to control a substantial portion of the 
shares outstanding without making large equity investments (Ciccotello, 2014).  
One of the ways private equity firms are presumed to create value in their target firms is by 
reducing the agency costs of free cash flow. In particular, their organisations are structured in 
a way which increases the incentives to monitor and improve the performance and profitability 
of the portfolio company. Through a substantial performance or success fee (often 20% of the 
value created over a given hurdle rate), the personal wealth of the general partners in the 
private equity firm is tied almost directly to the shareholders’ returns on their investment in 
the portfolio company, with a much higher degree of alignment than most executives of public 
companies. Adding to this effect, the staff and other costs of private equity firms are kept lean, 
increasing the general managers’ personal incentives from a large compensation (Jensen, 
1989), and resulting in interests more aligned with those of the investors.  
In addition to the high correlation between company performance and the general managers’ 
wealth, private equity companies typically focus on tying the target management’s incentives 
to the value of the company in order to align their interests with that of the owners (Jensen 
1989). Management compensation systems usually consist of both salaries, bonuses, stock and 
options. According to Jensen (1989), the sensitivity of the typical business-unit manager’s 
salary to the company performance rises almost 20 times in a buyout.  
Furthermore, private equity firms often require the target managers to make personal 
investments in the company. This ensures that the managers face downside risk, as well as an 
upside. Additionally, as the company is private, and hence the equity illiquid, target 
management’s incentives for manipulation of short-term investments are reduced (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2009). Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) find that even though stock and option-based 
compensation have become more frequently used in public corporations, management’s 
upside through ownership share remain greater in private equity firms than in public 
corporations.  
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On the contrary, critics of the private equity company raises the question about whether these 
firms can really be a long-term alternative to the public corporation (Rappaport, 1990). 
Although there seems to be arguments for the superiority of private equity firms regarding 
mitigation of agency costs of free cash flow, it might be that the initiatives taken are not a 
sustainable solution in a long-term perspective. As several of the advantages rely on the 
structure and business model of the private equity firm, it is not certain that the improvements 
will last once they exit.  
2.3 The Impact of Leverage on Mitigation of Agency Costs of 
Free Cash Flow 
The transaction model of private equity firms is built around a highly leveraged financial 
structure, and a buyout can typically be financed with 60 to 90 % debt (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2009). In addition to reducing the principal-agent problem through allowing for a more 
concentrated ownership, leverage could also help reduce the free cash flow available for 
spending and thereby the agency costs of free cash flow. 
Jensen (1986) states that debt can motivate managers to run a company more efficiently and 
hence mitigate agency costs of free cash flow and names this effect the control hypothesis for 
debt creation. He further states that firms prone to agency problems of free cash flow are 
characterised as having “unused borrowing power”, and that private equity firms exploit this 
by leveraging their acquisition transactions. Debt payments force managers to commit to their 
promise to pay out future cash flows in a more binding way than regular dividends, and thereby 
decreases the cash available for managers to spend on wasteful behaviour or low return 
investments (Jensen, 1986). Lehn and Poulsen (1989) support Jensen’s view by claiming that 
while the penalty of dividend reductions is stock price reduction, the penalty for defaulting on 
a debt service payment is much more serious. As the management’s personal wealth is more 
sensitive to financial distress than stock price reductions, we believe this effect to be especially 
applicable for management. This is a consequence of the target management’s low sensitivity 
to the stock price mentioned earlier, combined with the real downside risk the management 
face from their company facing eventual bankruptcy.  
Some might argue that most of the gains coming from leveraging the private equity 
transactions arises due to tax savings. Several studies claim that private equity firms favour 
targets with large pre-buyout tax expenses, as these targets are the ones which can potentially 
 11 
offer the largest tax shields (Opler and Titman, 1993). Other studies find that this value 
creation is captured in the acquisition premium paid by private equity firms (Newbould et al., 
1992; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). Despite this, Opler and Titman (1993) state that it is unlikely 
that firms take on such a high amount of debt only to achieve tax savings, because they often 
lever up more than what is optimal to eliminate their taxable earnings. Opler and Titman 
(1993) also studies determinants of LBO activity and find that high financial distress costs 
deter LBOs. This evidence illustrates the importance of debt for value creation in private 
equity transactions.  
2.4 Bidder Types in the Acquisitions Market 
Gorbenko & Malenko (2014) divide the set of bidders in the acquisition market into two 
groups: strategic acquirers (typically industrially oriented companies) and financial acquirers 
(typically private equity firms). They claim that the takeover market is characterised by a 
segmentation between financial and strategic bidders, whereby different targets appeal to 
different bidders. Several studies find support for this segmentation view (Fidrmuc et al., 2012; 
Gorbenko & Malenko, 2014: Bargeron et al., 2008). This segmentation can probably be 
explained by the fundamental differences between the two bidder groups. In contrast to private 
equity firms, strategic bidders typically desire to acquire targets which offer long-term 
operational synergies (Gorbenko & Malenko, 2014). Consequently, they often have either a 
horizontal or a vertical link to the target company and favour specific industries which can 
potentially offer such synergistic effects. Strategic bidders, in contrast to private equity firms 
also tend to seek targets associated with growth potential (Fidrmuc et al., 2012).  
As previously mentioned, private equity firms typically search for under-performing and 
undervalued companies. Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) find that financial bidders pay a 
higher premium for poorly performing targets, compared to strategic bidders. According to 
Bhattacharya (1979), under certain conditions, dividends function as an indicator of expected 
cash flows and thereby performance. The two bidder groups might therefore also target 
companies with different dividend policies.  
In addition, previous research finds evidence that strategic bidders target larger companies 
than private equity firms (Bargeron et al., 2008, Fidrmuc et al., 2012). The literature also seems 
to agree on a relationship existing between target’s size and the bidder’s willingness to pay. 
However, there seems to be disagreement on the direction of the impact target size has on the 
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acquisition premium. Alexandridis et al. (2013) and Gorton et al. (2009) find that target size 
is negatively associated with acquisition premia. They claim there could be several factors 
explaining this relationship, among them the fact that overpayment potential tends to be lower 
in larger transactions and that there tends to be less competition prevalent in acquisitions of 
larger targets. On the contrary, Loderer and Martin (1990) find that acquirers are more likely 
to overpay when buying large targets.  
Furthermore, strategic bidders and private equity firms also target companies with different 
degrees of leverage. As previously discussed, theory provides evidence consistent with the 
view that private equity firms target companies with underutilised debt capacity. Despite these 
reflections, prior research finds evidence that private equity firms acquire targets with higher 
leverage compared to strategic bidders (Bargeron et al., 2008; Fidrmuc et al., 2012). Bargeron 
et al. (2008) argues that these findings could be a result of highly levered companies having 
weaker bargaining positions as a result of not being able to recapitalise and avoid or repel 
takeovers. As strategic bidders pay significantly larger acquisition premiums compared to 
private equity firms (Bargeron et al., 2008; Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014), acquisitions made 
by private equity firms are expected to benefit target shareholders less. Hence, if a company 
has the desire and ability to resist a private equity acquisition due to low leverage, it might be 
more challenging for private equity firms to buy companies with little debt.  
Moreover, Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) state that the valuations used by the two groups are 
affected differently by overall economic conditions. Possible explanations for this could be 
that the profitability, and thereby liquidity, of the two buyer groups is affected differently by 
macroeconomic changes, for instance as a consequence of the high leverage in private equity 
transactions, or that political changes favour one group over the other. In addition, it might be 
that the two groups have different strategies for the timing of acquisitions. More specifically, 
private equity firms might have a higher sensitivity to economic changes than strategic 
companies due to the purpose of the acquisitions being more financially driven, whereas 
strategic acquisitions often are based on longer term strategic priorities and demands. On the 
contrary, as private equity firms attempt to acquire undervalued targets, they might be more 
likely to initiate acquisitions when the rest of the market is in a downturn (Gorbenko and 
Malenko, 2014).  
There seems to be few studies performed on the differences between the two bidder groups’ 
ability to mitigate agency costs of free cash flow. Nevertheless, we expect strategic bidders to 
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have a lower ability to mitigate their target’s agency costs of free cash flow compared to 
private equity firms. According to Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) financial bidders, such as 
private equity firms, can use their relationships and reputation to obtain financing at a lower 
cost than strategic bidders. This is in line with evidence from Demiroglu and James (2010) 
and Ivashina and Kovner (2011). We believe that private equity firms’ potential access to 
cheaper debt makes it easier for them to exploit the benefits of leverage. In addition, it is likely 
that the short time horizon of private equity companies enables them to make unpopular 
changes for the employees to a greater extent than an acquiring firm which has a longer time-
perspective. We rely this on the idea that the employees will view the private equity firm as a 
transient owner, while a strategic owner will need to maintain a better relationship with the 
employees in order to preserve an impression of an attractive workplace. Further, different 
ownership structure among the strategic bidders, resulting from some being private and some 
being public, could cause differences in the ability to mitigate agency costs of free cash flow 
within the group of strategic bidders. Even though ownership structure varies greatly among 
public firms, we assume that the average public company has a more diverse ownership than 
the average private company, and hence that they have lower incentives to reduce the 
principal-agent problem. We therefore expect public strategic bidders to be less able to 
mitigate agency costs of free cash flow compared to private strategic bidders. Bargeron et al. 
(2008) argues that even though private equity firms can have many financial investors in their 
funds, the acquisition, development and exit decisions are made by the managing partners who 
have incentives closely aligned with those of investors. 
2.5 The Impact of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis on Private 
Equity Firms’ Purchasing Behaviour 
The intention of this study is to examine the relationships proposed by Jensen (1989) in respect 
of whether private equity firm acquisition targets are prone to agency problems of free cash 
flow. We do not consider whether private equity firms are in fact able to mitigate agency costs 
of free cash flow, but rather whether they believe they can obtain a return by reducing these 
costs. Hence, our study is confined to the private equity companies’ ex ante calculated exit 
price, and not the actual long-term value creation. To examine this relationship, we look at 
whether a higher amount of free cash flow withheld increases the likelihood of a target being 
acquired by a private equity firm. As Jensen’s (1989) statement concerns public companies 
only, and with regards to our elaboration in this chapter, we believe it is appropriate to study 
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only public targets. Further, as discussed above, we are not in a position to draw conclusions 
about agency costs of free cash flow for companies with substantial growth opportunities. 
Thus, we believe studying only low growth targets will yield more reliable and accurate 
results. Furthermore, we believe it is favourable to compare our private equity transactions to 
other transactions where the acquirer is not able to mitigate agency costs of free cash flow to 
the same extent as private equity firms. Hence, we find the natural group for comparison 
purposes to be transactions performed by public strategic bidders. If Jensen’s theory holds, we 
believe these two groups should be the two with the largest difference when it comes to their 
handling of targets’ agency costs of free cash flow. Thus, we expect to observe targets of 
private equity companies to be more prone to agency costs of free cash flow prior to the 
acquisition, compared to targets of public strategic bidders.  
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Opler and Titman (1993) provide evidence consistent with the 
relationships between the free cash flow hypothesis and private equity firms proposed by 
Jensen (1989). Both studies find that companies acquired by private equity firms have greater 
undistributed free cash flow than companies which did not go private, i.e. companies which 
were not taken over. Halpern et al. (1999) examine the same relationships as Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) and compare the free cash flow of companies acquired by private equity firms to 
companies which did not go private and to companies acquired by other operating companies. 
Contrary to the findings of Lehn and Poulsen (1989), they find a positive, but not significant, 
coefficient for their measure of free cash flow. However, their study focuses on the effect of 
managerial holdings on the acquisition premium and they explain their insignificant free cash 
flow coefficient by arguing that the relationships proposed by Jensen only apply to firms with 
low levels of managerial ownership. We believe that their argument can be seen in relation to 
our previous discussion of the importance of the governance and control mechanisms on the 
level of agency costs of free cash flow.  
The above mentioned studies are difficult to compare because the variables chosen to test the 
free cash flow hypothesis, as well as the calculations of these variables, vary. In our opinion, 
and as further discussed in our variables-section, some of the variables used in these studies 
do not just capture agency costs of free cash flow, but rather other target characteristics causing 
these target firms to be acquired by private equity firms, for instance past performance. 
Drawing conclusions based on previous research has therefore proven to be difficult. Further, 
prior research on the relationship between private equity firms and agency costs of free cash 
flow does not, to our knowledge, distinguish between low- and high- growth targets. We 
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suspect that the mixed evidence could be a result of both applying inappropriate measures of 
free cash flow and performing the analyses on both low- and high- growth companies, making 
it challenging to identify the relationship proposed by Jensen (1989).  
Based on the above discussion, we have constructed our first hypothesis: 
2.5.1 Hypothesis 1 
For low growth targets, a higher undistributed free cash flow makes it more likely that 
the acquirer is a private equity firm rather than a public strategic company. 
2.6 Private Equity Acquisition Premia 
In the stock market, shareholders owning a small stake in a company will, in most scenarios, 
not have the power to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow that might be present in a 
particular company. Thus, the share price of the company will reflect the remaining value to 
shareholders after the consequences of management’s eventual potential wasteful behaviour. 
In other words, the market’s valuation of a company, which theoretically should equal the 
discounted value of future cash flows, should be the company’s stand-alone value in the 
presence of agency costs of free cash flow. In contrast, a valuation performed by a private 
equity firm should, if Jensen’s (1989) theory holds, be equal to the stand-alone value as 
calculated by the market, plus the additional value generated by the mitigation of agency costs 
of free cash flow. The difference between the two valuations, i.e. the additional value 
generated by the mitigation of agency costs of free cash flow, should reflect the private equity 
company’s highest excess willingness to pay, relative to the market3. In a world with full 
competition, this maximum excess willingness to pay relative to the market should equal the 
acquisition premium. The discussed relationships are illustrated in figure 2.1. Although there 
are other effects impacting the valuations in reality, this is the relationship we intend to study, 
and thus the scenario we attempt to create in our analysis.  
Hence, if mitigation of agency costs of free cash flow is an important value driver in private 
equity acquisitions, this should be reflected in the private equity firms’ excess willingness to 
 
3 Relying on the assumption that the market’s willingness to pay equals the share price. 
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pay, relative to the market. More specifically, if Jensen’s (1989) hypothesis is correct, we 
expect the premium paid by private equity firms, in a scenario of full competition, to be higher 
for targets which seems to be prone to agency costs of free cash flow. As previously discussed, 
these targets are likely to be characterised by having a substantial undistributed free cash flow 
in combination with low growth opportunities.  
Figure 2.1  
Illustration of concept behind the hypotheses. Simplified example assuming full competition and that mitigation 
of agency costs of free cash flow is the only competitive advantage of private equity firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, as there is not necessarily full competition and homogenous valuations in the private 
equity market, the acquisition value does not necessarily represent the winning bidder’s 
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valuations, depends on the competition in the acquisition process. In a scenario without full 
competition, the winning bidder only needs to pay marginally above the runner up bidder’s 
valuation, resulting in a premium lower than the winner’s maximum willingness to pay. In the 
extreme scenario that a private equity firm is the only bidder in an acquisition process, they 
do, in theory, only need to pay marginally above the stand-alone value of the company. In 
these cases, the premium will reflect the control premium.  
Jensen (1989) states that the high acquisition premium paid by private equity firms may 
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al., 1999; Kieschnick, 1989). As previously mentioned, and as further discussed in our 
variables-section, we are concerned that some of the free cash flow measures used in certain 
studies do not just capture agency costs of free cash flow, but rather other target characteristics 
causing private equity firms to pay higher or lower premiums for these targets. An example of 
such effects could be that the measures of free cash flow are biased because they capture past 
performance. We argue that the inconsistent evidence could be a result of applying these 
inadequate measures of free cash flow and of preforming the analyses on both low- and high- 
growth companies, making it challenging to identify the relationship proposed by Jensen 
(1989). 
As a result of the discussion above, we intend to study whether private equity firms have a 
higher excess willingness to pay, relative to the market, for targets prone to agency costs of 
free cash flow. Although we examine whether targets prone to agency costs of free cash flow 
appeal to private equity bidders in our first hypothesis, we additionally want to study the 
magnitude of the value private equity companies expect they can create in these transactions4. 
We test this by using the acquisition premium paid by private equity companies as a proxy for 
their excess willingness to pay above the market valuation. Hence, we intend to study whether 
targets with higher levels of free cash flow withheld receive a higher acquisition premium. We 
also limit this analysis to public low growth targets for the same reasons as discussed for our 
first hypothesis.  
Consequently, our second hypothesis will be: 
2.6.1 Hypothesis 2 
For low growth target companies, a higher free cash flow is associated with a higher 
acquisition premium paid by private equity firms. 
 
4 The intention of this study is not to examine whether private equity firms truly create value through mitigation of agency 
costs of free cash flow for their target firms, but rather if they are willing to pay more because they expect that they can obtain 
a return by reducing these costs.  
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2.7 Relevance of Our Study 
While this paper will not be a study of how the relationships have changed, it is important to 
acknowledge that Jensen’s “Eclipse of the Public Corporation” (1989) was written 30 years 
ago. Jensen’s analysis, and other studies on this topic, might have made the owners of public 
companies and the markets monitoring them more aware of the existence and magnitude of 
these agency costs. Hence, the relationships between public corporations and agency problems 
of free cash flow could have changed since the article was published. This idea is supported 
by the fact that US public firms are different now compared to when Jensen developed his 
theory (Kahle and Stulz, 2017). There has been a change in the focus on governance and 
control issues in public markets as well as in business in general. In addition, the payout rate 
to shareholders of US firms, defined as dividends plus repurchases, has increased substantially 
the later years. For instance, in most years since the year of 2000, US public firms have 
repurchased more equity than they have issued (Kahle and Stulz, 2017). If it is the case that 
owners of public companies have had the ability to reduce agency costs of free cash flow 
themselves, it might be that these agency costs are not as present as before. However, as 
mentioned in the introduction, it does seem like agency costs of free cash flow is still an 
occurring issue in public companies. 
Adding to the question about a changed relation, the disclosure of private equity firms’ 
advantage in reducing agency costs of free cash flow in their target firms can have given other 
acquirers incentives to exploit these opportunities. Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) states that 
strategic bidders could theoretically implement the same changes as private equity firms. 
Hence, if the comparative advantage of private equity firms is possible to replicate, and if this 
has indeed been the development, the relations we are looking for might no longer be present. 
On the contrary, as already discussed, there are certain aspects of private equity firms’ 
assumed comparative advantage which might not be possible to replicate for other acquirers. 
If this is the case, it might be that the increased amount of capital allocated to the private equity 
market can partially be explained by the acknowledgement of private equity firms’ ability to 
mitigate agency costs of free cash flow. Even though we do not study the evolution of these 
relations, we believe the discussion above justifies the relevance and importance of testing our 
hypotheses.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
The following section presents a brief description of the data sample used in this study. In 
addition, we introduce the relevant variables used in our study and explain the rationale for 
including them in our regression models. Lastly, we describe the chosen empirical 
methodology.  
3.1 Data Collection and Description 
We collect all data on financial transactions from the SDC Platinum database. The sample 
period covers the years 2009 through 2018. This time span is mainly chosen to avoid capturing 
the most substantial effects from the financial crisis in 2007-8, as we expect including 
transactions from this period could potentially lead us to wrongfully conclude on relations that 
will not be relevant in normal circumstances. Further, we require the acquisition target to have 
pre-buyout characteristics available in the COMPUSTAT- and Thomson Reuters Eikon- 
databases. Information on analyst coverage of the target prior to the acquisition is collected 
from Thomson Reuters Eikon and target pre-buyout financial data is collected from 
COMPUSTAT. All financial accounting information is stated in million USD. The date of 
financial accounts from SDC is used as the primary date to collect financial information from 
the other databases. In the event that no financial information was available for the SDC-date, 
we search the databases for information one year prior. We manually control that missing 
financial data is reported correctly and merge our databases in order to substitute variables 
with data from the other databases in the case of errors.  
As we would find it valuable and interesting for our analysis to include acquirer characteristics, 
we try to collect this data from the databases we have access to. Unfortunately, as most private 
equity firms are not publicly traded and thus reveal very little information to the public, we 
are not able to collect sufficient data on acquirer characteristics to make use of it in our 
analyses. 
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To be included in our sample we have the following requirements:  
• The acquisition had to take place in the US. We require both the bidder and the acquirer 
to be US firms.  
• Deal value and premium paid has to be available in SDC.  
• The target had to be publicly listed prior to the acquisition.  
• The acquirer has to be categorised as either a private equity firm (utilising a LBO 
strategy) or a public strategic bidder. Venture capital firms are excluded from the 
sample. Transactions characterised as financial sponsor deals are manually checked to 
make sure the bidder is indeed a private equity firm (LBO). 
• The acquisition consideration offered has to be cash only. Since private companies do 
not have publicly traded equity to offer in an acquisition, most of their deals are cash 
acquisitions (Bargeron et al., 2008). To be able to identify the acquisition value of the 
transaction with certainty, we have limited our sample to cash deals only (Gorbenko 
and Malenko, 2014).  
• Private equity firms usually buy a majority stake in their target companies (Døskeland 
and Strömberg, 2018). Owning a majority stake allows the private equity firm to 
implement the desired changes for the target company. To ensure we compare similar 
transactions performed by private equity firms and public strategic bidders, we require 
the percentage of target shares owned by the acquirer after the transaction to be at least 
50%. 
• The acquisition is not a self-tender, repurchase or recapitalisation. 
 
After applying the criteria listed above, as well as requiring the transactions to have data 
available in the COMPUSTAT- and Thomson Reuters Eikon- databases, we are left with 700 
transactions that took place from 2009 to 2018. Of these transactions, 135 were completed by 
private equity firms and 565 were completed by public strategic bidders.  
As a result of the discussion presented in section 2.1, we further limit our sample to low growth 
companies only. Instead of setting our growth threshold to one as in previous literature (Lang 
et al., 1991), we limit our sample to the companies with Tobin’s Q below the median of ~1.19. 
This threshold is mainly chosen to avoid shrinking our data set more than necessary. However, 
considering the fact that Jensen describes low growth firms only, we believe the threshold can 
be justified as we assume a Tobin’s Q of ~1.19 can be considered as low growth. As all our 
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regression analyses rely on our main variable of interest, 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
, in addition to Tobin’s Q, we 
require the transactions to have data available to calculate the two. Our final sample thus 
comprises 343 transactions of which 68 were completed by private equity firms and 275 by 
public strategic bidders. The availability of financial information used to calculate our other 
variables does differ, and hence, the exact number of transactions included in each analysis 
varies depending on the variables included.  
In order to make sure our results are not driven by extreme outliers, we winsorize variables 
where this is an issue, which could otherwise give us a biased picture.  
Figure A.2 (see appendix A.2) sets out the number of transactions in our sample grouped by 
one-digit target SIC code, across bidder type. The figure shows that the transactions are not 
evenly distributed between the two bidder groups with regard to targets’ industry. We observe 
that most of the private equity transactions occur within the service-, manufacturing-, and 
wholesale trade- industries. We also see that the two industries with the highest number of 
transactions, irrespective of bidder type, are the service- and manufacturing- industries. Our 
sample distribution of transactions across industries are comparable to that of Bargeron et al. 
(2008).  
Figure 3.1  
Sample of low growth target firms by year. The sample period covers the year of 2009 through 2018. The figure 
illustrates the number of acquisitions within each year of our sample, across bidder type. 
  
Figure 3.1 sets out the number of transactions in our sample per year, across bidder type. 
Similarly to the industry distribution, we observe that the transactions are not evenly 
distributed between the two bidder groups with regard to the year of the transaction. The 
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growth in aggregated deal value mentioned in the introduction is not visible in the figure. 
According to Bain & Company (2019), the growth in the aggregate value of public to private 
deals is a result of larger deals rather than an increased deal count. Figure A.3 (see appendix 
A.3) displays that our sample follows approximately the same trends as described in the market 
report by Bain & Company (2019).  
3.2 Regression Variables 
In this section we introduce the relevant variables used in our study and explain the rationale 
for including them in our regression models. All variables, unless otherwise specified, are 
based on pre-buyout target characteristics.  
3.2.1 Dependent Variable for Buyer Type Regression: Private Equity 
Bidder 
To test our first hypothesis, we want to estimate whether the likelihood of the acquirer being 
a private equity firm relative to a public strategic company is larger for targets which seems 
prone to agency costs of free cash flow. Thus, the dependent variable of our first regression 
model is a binary variable equal to one if the acquirer is a private equity firm and zero if the 
acquirer is a public strategic company.  
3.2.2 Dependent Variable for Acquisition Premium Regression: 
Acquisition Premium 
For our second hypothesis, we intend to examine whether private equity firms pay a higher 
acquisition premium for targets which seems prone to agency costs of free cash flow. Hence, 
the dependent variable in our second regression model is the acquisition premium paid by a 
private equity firm. The dependent variable is a continuous variable calculated as the 
difference between the offer price and the target closing stock price four weeks before the 
announcement of the acquisition, expressed as a percentage of the stock price. Following other 
empirical research on acquisitions, we collect the target market value per share (i) one day 
prior to the date of the announcement, (ii) one week prior to the date of the announcement and 
(iii) four weeks prior to the date of the announcement. Fidrmuc et al. (2012) find that targets 
of private equity firms are likely to leak information, indicating that using the target share 
price close to announcement date might cause our premium measure to be biased. If 
information leakage has occurred, we expect a significant share price runup in the weeks prior 
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to the announcement. We find evidence of this in our sample and thus measure the premium 
using the market value per share four weeks prior to the date of the announcement in order to 
avoid capturing the consequences of information leakage when calculating the premium. We 
could alternatively measure the premium using the market price further back in time. However, 
we believe this could cause us to capture other factors from the market affecting the share 
price and potentially bias our premium measure.  
Although the acquisition premium is likely to be the best proxy available for excess 
willingness to pay relative to the market, it does have certain limitations. Firstly, it relies on 
the key assumption of full competition and rational players in the acquisition market.  Further, 
it is not adjusted for a benchmark return. In addition, when using the acquisition premium as 
a measure for private equity firms’ calculated value creation, it is important to acknowledge 
that the share price does not necessarily represent a company’s fundamental value. For 
example, the market might forecast that a target will be subject to an acquisition, and hence 
speculation might drive the share price up prior to the deal. In that case, a part of the potential 
premium will be incorporated in the share price, and all else equal, the premium will be lower. 
It might also be that the share price is artificially high as a result of increased liquidity in the 
market. If this is only due to a “strong” market, it is not certain that the valuation of private 
equity firms will be scaled up by the same factor, and thus the premium, which is a percentage, 
could be different dependent on the market. At the same time, we expect private equity firms 
to acquire undervalued targets. If a weak market makes the targets more under-priced and the 
transaction value of private equity acquisitions is equal to their maximum willingness to pay, 
it may lead to a higher takeover premium.  
Another concern related to using the acquisition premium as a measure of calculated value 
creation is if the share price used as the basis for calculating the premium is not representing 
the actual market value of the company because the stock has not been actively traded for an 
extended period of time. As we do not have access to liquidity data for our sample, we attempt 
to test whether the equity of the targets in our sample lacks liquidity by studying the movement 
of each target company’s share price in the year leading up to the transaction. As we do not 
find any companies that have severe illiquidity in our sample, we do not proceed to control for 
this. 
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3.2.3 Independent Variable: Free Cash Flow 
Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow as cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects 
with positive net present value when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. However, as 
the present value of a company’s projects is not publicly available, the free cash flow described 
by Jensen (1986) proves difficult to measure in practice. We therefore use a proxy for excess 
free cash flow in our study.  
For our main analyses, we use a measure of free cash flow first applied by Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) and later used in other studies such as Lang et al. (1991) and Halpern et al. (1999), as 
we believe it is the best proxy for the withheld free cash flow discussed by Jensen. The free 
cash flow (FCF) measure is calculated as: 
FCF = Operating income before depreciation – Tax – Interest expenses - Dividends 
and represents the cash flow left after operations which was not distributed to shareholders, 
creditors or the government. By subtracting the required payments of the company, we are left 
with the cash flow which could potentially be misused by the management. 
Alternatively, it would have been interesting to include research and development (R&D) 
expenses in our free cash flow measure as the relative importance of these expenses versus 
capital expenditures have changed since Jensen’s theory was developed (Kahle and Stulz, 
2017). Unfortunately, the insufficient information on R&D in our dataset limits us from 
performing such an analysis. Further, it would also have been valuable to subtract share 
repurchases from our free cash flow measure. Share repurchases could create shareholder 
value by reducing the capital which could be subject to wastage by management. However, it 
also proves difficult to obtain sufficient and reliable data on share repurchases for our sample 
of target companies.  
Opler and Titman (1993) use operating income before interest, taxes and depreciation 
(EBITDA) as their proxy for excess free cash flow, and Lang et al. (1991) report operating 
cash flow as an alternative measure of cash flow. We find these measures misleading because 
they do not account for distribution to shareholders and creditors, which is essential in order 
to identify the cash that could potentially be subject to wastage from the cash that is paid out. 
However, it serves as an alternative measure of cash flow available for managers to misuse on 
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low-return investments. Due to our concerns, we do not use these measures in our main 
models, but report Lang et al.’s (1991) alternative measure of cash flow as a robustness test. 
For our main regression model, we follow Lang et al. (1991) and scale our free cash flow 
measure by the book value of assets. However, different scaling factors have been proposed 
and used in the previous literature. Lehn and Poulsen, (1989) and Lehn et al., (1990) scale 
their free cash flow measures by the market value of equity, and Opler and Titman (1993) 
scale by the sum of the firm’s market value of equity and book value of debt. We argue that a 
weakness to scaling free cash flow by the market value of equity is that the denominator which 
is, at least in theory, the discounted value of all future cash flows, could be strongly correlated 
with the numerator. Hence, the more front loaded the cash flows are, the closer the ratio is to 
one. It could also be an issue that our dependent variable in our acquisition premium regression 
is calculated based on the target’s market value of equity. However, as this scaling factor is 
commonly used in previous literature, we report it as a robustness test. Another frequently 
used scaling factor proposed by previous literature is net sales (Halpern et al., 1999). We 
additionally check the robustness of our analyses to this scaling factor and report it in the 
results section.  
Our measure of free cash flow is likely to be particularly sensitive to economic changes as a 
firm’s operating income is likely to be correlated with economic conditions. On the contrary, 
common dividends and interest expenses are normally fixed to a larger degree, on a short-term 
perspective. As the market interprets a decrease in dividends as a severe signal of trouble, 
firms are generally reluctant about changing their payout policies. At the same time, interest 
payments are an expense which is not easy to cut on a short-term perspective in the case of a 
weak economic environment.  
A weakness to our free cash flow measure is that it characterises all free cash flow after 
distribution as waste, not allowing for any investments or necessary accumulation of cash to 
manage varying working capital needs. On the one hand, as we, in line with Jensen’s (1986) 
hypothesis, only study companies with low growth opportunities, a large part of this issue is 
eliminated because large investments and cash accumulations should not be necessary. On the 
other hand, low growth companies also need to make investments at a certain level to be able 
to maintain their daily operations. Further, there are several acceptable reasons why firms need 
to accumulate cash, for instance for precautionary reasons (Bates et al., 2009). However, as 
our sample consists only of companies with low growth opportunities, we argue that the 
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average company should have reason to accumulate more cash without it being a form of 
wasteful behaviour. We do acknowledge there might be seasonal variations in liquidity which 
forces also low growth companies to spend cash from their reserves and accumulate cash over 
the year. Having said that, it could be hypothesised that the kind of liquidity cycle which the 
market does not evaluate as a change in the growth options of an industry rarely is likely to 
last more than a year. Even if this does not hold, we assume the size of our sample will correct 
for the potential differences. As our measure of cash flow, like normal cash flow statements, 
is measured annually, potential accumulated cash should only reflect accumulation above the 
level of cash in the opening balance. In the case that seasonal liquidity variations cause 
spending and accumulation of cash through the year, but both is of an equal amount, it will 
not be measured as cash accumulation.  
3.2.4 Sample Constraint: Low Growth Firms  
A frequently used measure for growth opportunities, and what most literature seems to agree 
to be the best proxy, is Tobin’s Q (Lang et al., 1991; Opler and Titman, 1993; Halpern et al., 
1999). In our study, we follow these authors by using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firms’ growth 
opportunities. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of assets relative to the replacement 
cost of assets. Since the replacement cost of assets is difficult to measure, the book value of 
assets is often used as a proxy to estimate the ratio. We therefore calculate Tobin’s Q as the 
sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
Further, as previously discussed, we limit our sample to low growth firms defined as firms 
with Tobin’s Q below the sample median of ~1.19. The decision of limiting our sample to 
only low growth firms is mainly motivated by the discussion given in the theoretical 
framework. To investigate whether this limitation can be justified, we have checked if our 
analyses yield the same results when using the unconstrained sample, consisting of low- and 
high- growth firms. From these analyses we observe that the relations become weaker, and in 
some cases disappear, when high growth firms are included in the sample. In our opinion, this 
indicates the importance of limiting our study to low growth firms in order to identify the 
proposed relations. Further, as previously discussed, the use of our free cash flow measure as 
a proxy for excess free cash flow relies on the assumption that the target is a low growth firm.  
A weakness to the growth measure is that it relies heavily on the assumption that the market 
prices the share correctly according to its fundamental value. Often, a large part of the 
company-specific information necessary to price a company is not publicly available, causing 
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information asymmetry between the management and the market. This, and other factors such 
as liquidity, might lead the share price to be incorrect with regard to valuing growth 
opportunities. Previous research has used different approaches to measure a firm’s growth 
opportunities. One example is the firm’s sales growth, used by Lehn and Poulsen (1989). A 
difficulty with this variable is that it is calculated based on historical data, which is not 
necessarily a good proxy for future performance in a company. In addition, it is possible that 
sales growth proxies for the tendency of managers to spend free cash flow in value-reducing 
ways, for instance on low return projects, to expand the size of their company. If these low 
return projects reduce equity value but increase sales, this variable will appear to be measuring 
high growth opportunities of the company when it really is measuring the non-productive use 
of free cash flow. However, limiting our sample only to target companies with Tobin’s Q 
below the median relies on the assumption that Tobin’s Q truly captures growth opportunities 
and is not biasing our sample on other aspects. As the impact on our sample, and therefore 
assumingly our analysis, from this choice is substantial, the error from using a measure which 
biases our results could be critical. To make sure this is not the case, we report a robustness 
check where we perform our analyses substituting Tobin’s Q for the target firm’s three-year 
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of sales and limit our sample to the section below 
the sample median of ~0.036. 
3.2.5 Control Variables 
In this section, we discuss the control variables used in our regression models. The control 
variables are characteristics identified by previous literature as possible determinants of 
acquirer type in acquisitions and acquisition premium paid by private equity firms, which is 
correlated with the free cash flow measure. We include these variables in our regressions, to 
reduce potential omitted variable bias. Unless otherwise specified, all control variables are 
target characteristics. Calculations and definitions of the control variables are provided in 
appendix A.1.  
In addition to limiting our sample to low growth companies only, Tobin’s Q is included as a 
continuous control variable. As the two bidder groups have different strategies and desires for 
the growth of their targets, we believe Tobin’s Q could be a determinant of bidder type, as 
well as a determinant of the private equity acquisition premium. 
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Total assets are measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of the target’s total assets, 
and is included to account for the different purchasing behaviour of the bidder groups with 
regard to target size. We also expect target size to have an impact on the acquisition premium 
paid by private equity firms. 
Tax payable, measured as the target’s payable income tax to the target’s net sales, is included 
as we expect the likelihood of being acquired by a private equity firm, rather than a strategic 
bidder, to increase with large target pre-buyout taxes. This is also likely to impact the 
acquisition premium paid by private equity firms. 
Dividend is calculated as the total amount of dividends declared on all equity capital of the 
company divided by the company’s net sales. Paying dividends to shareholders is an 
endogenous choice of the target company itself. We expect this variable to potentially be a 
determinant of bidder type and therefore include it as a control variable in our regression 
analyses.  
For companies that are not financially constrained, their degree of leverage is endogenously 
decided by the company itself. As previously discussed, a company’s degree of leverage is 
likely to have an impact on bidder type in an acquisition, as well as to have an effect on the 
takeover premium paid by a private equity firm. Hence, leverage is included as a control 
variable and calculated as the ratio of the target’s book value of debt to the sum of the book 
value of debt plus the market value of equity. As previously stated, private equity firms tend 
to find targets with underutilised debt capacity appealing. The ideal measure to capture the 
effect of underutilised debt would be the difference between a firm’s optimal leverage and 
actual leverage. However, as a firm’s optimal amount of debt is difficult to calculate for our 
entire sample, amongst other things because we are not able to calculate their financial distress 
costs, we try to establish a proxy for this by using leverage and controlling for industry.  
As private equity firms target poorly performing companies, we expect the likelihood of being 
acquired by a private equity firm rather than a public strategic company to increase when the 
target is performing poorly. We expect this effect to negatively bias our free cash flow 
estimates in both regressions. To reduce this bias, we control for return on assets (ROA) 
which is among the most commonly used measures for operating performance (Barber and 
Lyon, 1996).  
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As agency costs of free cash flow is more likely to flourish in loosely monitored firms and 
firms with weak corporate governance, we attempt to establish a proxy for the quality of 
governance of a company using analyst coverage. Hence, we include the control variable 
analyst coverage which is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is followed by at least 
one analyst prior to the acquisition and zero otherwise. According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), analysts can be seen as external monitors of management and hence, being followed 
by analysts forces the managers to act more in line with shareholders’ interests. We therefore 
assume analyst coverage to be an indicator of how well governed a firm is. We originally 
desired to include managerial holdings in our analysis but are not able to obtain the needed 
data due to our limited access to databases and the time constraint of this thesis. However, we 
expect analyst coverage to have a similar impact as managerial holdings on agency costs of 
free cash flow. By controlling for analyst coverage, we are therefore able to look at variation 
in cash, conditional on having the same quality of governance. Thus, we also reduce the 
potential bias which might arise as a result of acceptable reasons for firms having excess free 
cash flow.  
The value of the index S&P 500 at the time of the acquisition is included in our models as we 
are concerned about drawing conclusions based on spurious correlations between our 
dependent and independent variables. Although the value of the S&P 500 index captures 
effects of time-trends, it does not control for potential changes over the time period which are 
not clearly visible in the index. An alternative to the S&P 500 could be to control for 
categorical variables for the year of the transaction. These categorical variables allow us to 
control for time fixed effects and will pick up variations in outcomes which change over time 
and are attributed to our explanatory variables. However, as economic change is not 
necessarily constrained to a specific year, and the variations within a given year might be 
substantial, grouping our transaction by year seems inaccurate. On the contrary, the S&P 500 
takes the exact announcement date into account. Due to multicollinearity issues, we are not 
able to control for both variables at once. Hence, we report the model including year fixed 
effects as a robustness test, based on discussion above.  
As the presence of competition for a target in an acquisition is an important determinant of the 
premium paid, we include the dummy variable competition. This variable takes the value one 
if a third party launched an offer for the target while the original bid was pending.  
 30
Further, we control for industry fixed effects in our variables by including a dummy variable 
for each of the eight groups of one-digit target SIC codes in our sample. This is necessary 
particularly because our measure of free cash flow relies on strong assumptions for the targets’ 
investments. By controlling for industry, we limit the bias that might arise from the differences 
in necessity for investments across industries. In addition, it could be that strategic acquirers 
see a higher potential for synergies in certain industries and consequently favour targets in 
these industries. Admittedly, one-digit SIC code is not an optimal grouping for industry as it 
lacks specificity. However, our sample size limits us to such a general grouping to avoid 
dropping observations where the industry group would only include one transaction. It is also 
worth noting that it has been debated whether SIC codes are a good approach to categorisation 
of companies by industry as it does not seem to be able to group firms with similar economic 
characteristics together (Clarke, 1989).  
3.3 Main Regression Models 
The following section briefly explains the chosen methodology used in performing our 
regression analyses. We intend to test two aspects of the free cash flow hypothesis in relation 
to private equity acquisitions. Firstly, if it affects the acquirer type for a given target in an 
acquisition, and secondly, to measure the magnitude of the relationship by analysing 
acquisition premia of private equity firms. In addition, we elaborate on the matching procedure 
used to obtain a balanced sample for our first regression. 
3.3.1 Acquirer Type Regression Model 
In order to estimate whether a higher value of our measure of target’s free cash flow increases 
the likelihood of the acquirer being a private equity firm relative to a public strategic company, 
we rely on a linear probability model. We use our sample of matched target firms to perform 
the regression analysis. The matching procedure is presented below. The linear probability 
model allows us to estimate the effect of various explanatory variables on a binary dependent 
variable and yields easily interpretable coefficients. It should be pointed out that the linear 
probability model does not ensure that the predicted probability that Y=1 only can take the 
values between zero and one for all values of x as in a logit model (Wooldridge, 2016). 
However, as a one-unit increase in our main variable of interest is not a reasonable change, 
the coefficients of a logit model expressed with odds ratios does not yield intuitively 
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interpretable results, and we therefore believe applying a linear probability model gives us a 
more desired output. Another alternative could have been to perform a logit regression and 
report the marginal effects, which yields results comparable to those of the linear probability 
model. We have performed this analysis to verify that the results are similar to the ones we 
obtain in our main regression model. Thus, we believe using a logit model transformed to 
marginal effects complicates our methodology without yielding improved results.  
Hence, in line with our first hypothesis, we regress the binary outcome variable, private equity, 
on our measure of free cash flow, controlling for variables believed to affect the relation, where 
the regression equation is specified as: 
P(𝑃𝐸 = 1|𝑥) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1
𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
+  𝛽2 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +  𝛽4
𝑇𝑎𝑥
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+  𝛽5
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+
𝛽6 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽8 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽9 𝑆𝑃500 + ∑ 𝜕𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢  
Where 𝛼 is the intercept and 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 is our independent variable proxying for the target’s withheld 
excess free cash flow. Tobin’s Q, Total Assets, 𝑇𝑎𝑥
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑠
, Leverage and ROA are continuous 
control variables defined in appendix A.1. Analyst Coverage is a dummy variable which takes 
the value one if the target company was followed by at least one analyst prior to the acquisition, 
and zero otherwise. SP500 is the value of the index at the date of the transaction. SICcode is a 
categorical variable representing the one-digit target SIC code. u captures the undefined effects 
influencing whether the acquirer is a private equity firm or a strategic bidder.  
If our first hypothesis holds, we expect the coefficient of our variable 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 to be positive, 
indicating that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of a firm getting acquired by a private equity 
company, rather than a public strategic company, is larger if the target’s 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 is larger.  
Identification Strategy: Matching Procedure 
As our sample of targets acquired by private equity firms could be different than the sample 
of targets acquired by public strategic companies, we are concerned about introducing 
selection bias when comparing the two target groups in our first regression. That is, differences 
among the two groups could determine the outcome variable. To overcome this potential issue, 
we apply a matching methodology where we match each target acquired by a private equity 
firm to a similar target acquired by a public strategic bidder to obtain a sample of comparable 
pairs. We want the probability of a company being acquired by a private equity firm or a public 
strategic bidder, prior to introducing the free cash flow measure, to be as equal as possible. 
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The rationale behind the matching methodology is that the observed effect of our free cash 
flow measure, in our bidder type regression, is more likely to reflect the causal effect rather 
than the selection bias in a sample of comparable pairs.  
Although several types of matching could be used, we have chosen to use nearest neighbour 
matching due to our limited sample size. We match our sample of 63 targets acquired by 
private equity firms with a list of 210 targets acquired by public strategic bidders based on 
target industry and market value of equity in addition to the transaction year. The resulting 
dataset consists of 60 targets acquired by private equity firms matched with the same number 
of targets acquired by public strategic bidders. A detailed elaboration on the matching 
procedure can be found in appendix A.4. 
As our sample size limits us from matching on all desirable aspects that could differ between 
the groups, we have attempted to match the targets based on variables which captures 
differences among them on multiple aspects. Unfortunately, there is a trade-off between 
matching on a high number of variables, which would give us more precise matches, and the 
number of targets matched. Except for certain modifications (see appendix A.4), our matching 
procedure is comparable to that used by Fidrmuc et al. (2012).  
We have prioritised matching on target industry as we expect it to be among the factors that 
determine most of the characteristics related both to the acquisition and the financial 
information of the target company. As the industry distribution between the two bidder groups 
is not similarly distributed (see appendix A.2), matching on industry reduces the potential 
omitted variable bias introduced by industry effects, such as investment requirements and 
potential synergies. Boone and Mulherin (2008), referred to in Fidrmuc et al. (2012), illustrate 
the importance of matching on these criteria by reporting that more than half of the private 
equity takeovers occur in only four industries. Further, we use the target’s size as a matching 
criterion as we believe it to be linked to relevant target and transaction characteristics. 
Matching on size is also important because public strategic bidders typically buy larger targets 
(Bargeron et al., 2008). Fidrmuc et al (2012) control for size by matching on transaction value. 
However, as the transaction value includes the acquisition premium paid, it might reflect the 
bidder’s subjective valuation, and not only the size of the target prior to the acquisition. The 
acquisition premium paid differs between the two bidder groups both in our sample and in 
those of previous literature (Bargeron et al., 2008). Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the 
two bidder groups have different degrees of willingness to pay, not necessarily driven by the 
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target’s size but rather the potential value creation they believe they can obtain by acquiring 
the target. In addition, there is a timing issue with attempting to describe a probability ex ante 
with a value measured ex post. As a result of this, we assume the market value of equity to be 
a better measure of size for the purpose of matching. Lastly, we match the targets based on the 
timing of the transaction as there might be market tendencies and macroeconomic factors 
which vary over time and affect both target characteristics and the behaviour of the different 
bidder groups.  
As the nearest neighbour matching does not match our targets perfectly on all chosen aspects, 
we still control for size and industry- and time- effects in our regression.  
A concern regarding matching is that we face the risk of matching two fundamentally different 
targets based on similarities in the target characteristics used for matching. If this is the case, 
we might obtain a sample where the targets seem similar but have different probabilities of 
being acquired by each bidder type, which might lead to biased results. We therefore report 
the acquirer type regression on our sample prior to performing the matching as a robustness 
test, in order to verify that our results are not driven by matching of incomparable transactions.  
3.3.2 Acquisition Premium Regression Model 
In order to test whether a higher value of the same measure of target’s free cash flow is 
associated with a higher acquisition premium, we use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. 
We believe the OLS model is the most suitable model given our continuous independent 
variable and either continuous or binary dependent variables.  
Further, our dependent variable, the acquisition premium, relies on the assumption of a 
competitive market in order to function as a proxy for the private equity firm’s excess 
willingness to pay above the market. Hence, the ideal way to test the intended relations would 
be to study only challenged deals. However, as we will present in the summary statistics, only 
four of the deals in our sample of private equity transactions were challenged deals. Due to 
the low amount of deals with competition in our sample, limiting our study to these 
transactions is clearly unfeasible.  
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Thus, in line with our second hypothesis, we regress the dependent variable, acquisition 
premium, on our measure of free cash flow, controlling for variables believed to affect the 
relationship. We specify the regression equation as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1
𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
+  𝛽2 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽4
𝑇𝑎𝑥
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽5
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+
𝛽6 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽8𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽9𝑆𝑃500 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
∑ 𝜕𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑆𝐼𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢  
Where 𝛼 is the intercept and 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 is our independent variable proxying for the target’s withheld 
excess free cash flow. Tobin’s Q, Total Assets, 𝑇𝑎𝑥
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
, Leverage and ROA are continuous 
control variables defined in appendix A.1. Analyst Coverage is a dummy variable which takes 
the value one if the target company was followed by at least one analyst prior to the acquisition, 
and zero otherwise. SP500 is the value of the index at the date of the transaction. Competition 
is a dummy variable equal to one if a third party launched an offer for the target while the 
original bid was pending. SICcode is a categorical variable representing the one-digit target 
SIC code. u captures changes in the acquisition premium that remains unexplained by the 
independent variables.  
If our second hypothesis holds, we expect the coefficient of our variable 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 to be positive, 
indicating that, ceteris paribus, the acquisition premium will be larger for targets with high 
values of 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
. 
 
 35 
4. Results 
In this chapter we present and interpret the empirical results of our analyses. We begin by 
presenting summary statistics for both the unmatched and the matched sample. Further, simple 
OLS-regression assumptions are discussed. Thereafter, we present the results of our regression 
analyses and interpret what the results imply for the corresponding hypothesis. Lastly, the 
results of our robustness tests and their implications are presented.  
4.1 Summary Statistics 
In this section we describe the characteristics and variables of our final sample of low growth 
companies. Table 4.1 sets out mean values and standard deviations of transaction- and target 
pre-buyout- characteristics, as well as differences in mean values for the reported 
characteristics across the two bidder groups. For our first hypothesis, we are interested in 
characteristics of targets acquired by both bidder groups, as well as differences among them. 
For the second hypothesis, we are particularly interested in the characteristics of targets 
acquired by private equity firms.  
As table 4.1 reveals, we find that private equity firms, when compared to public strategic 
bidders, acquire targets with statistically significantly larger free cash flows (𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
), Tobin’s Q, 
dividends and tax. Except for the larger Tobin’s Q, these results are similar to the findings of 
previous literature (Bargeron et al., 2008; Fidrmuc et al., 2012).  
Another interesting observation presented in table 4.1 is the limited degree of competition in 
our sample. We observe that approximately 6% of the private equity deals in our sample, 
amounting to 4 transactions, were challenged deals. The degree of competition is even lower 
for our sample of public strategic bidders. We interpret this as the competition in our sample 
being limited. It could be noted there can be other measures that better captures competition, 
for instance rumours and other measures based on private information. We have searched our 
databases for other measures of competition but are not able to identify any which indicates 
more competition in our dataset.  
As our sample consist of only low growth firms, it is not directly comparable to the samples 
of the previously mentioned literature. To verify whether our sample is similar to those used 
in previous literature when it is not limited to low growth firms, we additionally report 
 36
summary statistics for our entire sample of low- and high- growth firms (see appendix A.7). 
In contrast to the findings reported in table 4.1, we find that targets of private equity firms 
have significantly lower Tobin’s Q when compared to targets of public strategic bidders. In 
addition, and in contrast to what we observe in table 4.1, we also see that the acquisition 
premium difference between the two bidder groups is statistically significant on the 1% level. 
Although the difference is based on mean values and does not take control variables into 
account, this is consistent with the findings of Bargeron et al. (2008), who show that public 
target shareholders receive a higher premium when the acquirer is a public company rather 
than a private equity firm.  
Table 4.1 
Summary statistics table for our final sample of low growth target firms: Target and transaction characteristics. 
We report mean values and standard deviations as well as differences in means for all characteristics across the 
two bidder groups. The date of financials from SDC is used as the primary date to collect financial information 
from the other databases. The specification of all variables can be found in appendix A.1. 
  Private Equity Buyer Public Strategic Buyer  Public strategic - PE              
  Mean St.dev Min Max N Mean St.dev Min Max N Diff.  
p-
value 
FCF/TA 0.057 0.067 -0.138 0.220 65 0.035 0.079 -0.138 0.391 241 -0.022** 0.042 
FCF/MVE 0.137 0.240 -0.451 0.660 65 0.049 0.234 -0.606 0.431 241 -0.088*** 0.008 
FCF/Sales 0.065 0.086 -0.143 0.219 64 0.049 0.135 -0.282 0.322 235 -0.016 0.373 
OCF/TA 0.062 0.088 -0.207 0.279 68 0.035 0.130 -0.747 0.533 274 -0.028* 0.098 
Tobin's Q 0.812 0.255 0.207 1.163 68 0.727 0.302 0.044 1.180 275 -0.085** 0.034 
Sales CAGR (%) 3.28 18.23 -25.40 115.5 63 1.23 18.16 -190.0 117.6 265 -2.05 0.422 
Dividends/ Sales 0.009 0.019 0.000 0.070 66 0.017 0.039 -0.001 0.150 265 0.008* 0.093 
Ln Total Assets 6.26 1.43 2.89 9.72 68 6.06 1.73 2.34 10.27 275 -0.205 0.368 
Tax/ Sales 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.020 65 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.018 245 -0.001* 0.096 
Leverage 0.381 0.308 0.000 0.988 68 0.318 0.280 0.000 0.975 275 -0.063 0.104 
ROA -0.063 0.183 -0.840 0.162 67 -0.045 0.166 -0.976 0.594 269 0.018 0.437 
Premium (%) 45.44 62.74 -3.74 263.6 68 50.86 36.59 1.92 136.1 275 5.43 0.352 
Analyst Coverage 0.706 0.459 0.000 1.000 68 0.658 0.475 0.000 1.000 275 -0.048 0.456 
Competition 0.059 0.237 0.000 1.000 68 0.051 0.220 0.000 1.000 275 -0.008 0.794 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                     
** Significant at the 0.05 level           
* Significant at the 0.10 level                     
 
4.1.1 Sample Characteristics of Matched Sample 
As our acquirer type regression model relies on the matched sample, this section briefly 
describes the characteristics and variables of our matched dataset of low growth firms. 
Table 4.2 reports mean values and standard deviations of transaction- and target pre-buyout- 
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characteristics, as well as differences in means for the reported characteristics across the two 
bidder groups of our matched sample. 
The purpose of our matching process is to obtain a balanced sample of comparable targets 
across the two bidder groups on all other aspects than our free cash flow measure. As reflected 
in table 4.2, after performing our matching procedure, the only variable used in our main 
model which is statistically significant between the two groups of bidders is our free cash flow 
measure (𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
). The difference is statistically significant on the 1% level. These results indicate 
that the variables used for matching were able to capture differences between targets of the 
two bidder groups on multiple aspects, without reducing the variation in our free cash flow 
measure. We interpret these results as indications of a successful matching procedure and 
believe the dataset of matched target firms lets us capture the effects we are interested in with 
greater certainty.  
Table 4.2 
Summary statistics table for our matched sample of low growth target firms: Target and transaction 
characteristics. We report mean values and standard deviations as well as differences in means for all 
characteristics across the two bidder groups. The date of financials from SDC is used as the primary date to 
collect financial information from the other databases. The specification of all variables can be found in appendix 
A.1. 
  Private Equity Buyer Public Strategic Buyer  Public strategic - PE              
  Mean St.dev Min Max N Mean St.dev Min Max N Diff.  
p-
value 
FCF/TA 0.060 0.064 -0.173 0.220 60 0.023 0.085 -0.173 0.150 60 -0.038*** 0.007 
FCF/MVE 0.164 0.211 -0.244 0.695 60 0.008 0.335 -0.893 0.502 60 -0.156*** 0.003 
FCF/Sales 0.077 0.076 -0.077 0.239 60 0.011 0.194 -0.589 0.247 60 -0.067** 0.015 
OCF/TA 0.073 0.079 -0.168 0.279 60 0.035 0.158 -0.747 0.432 60 -0.038* 0.096 
Tobin's Q 0.821 0.256 0.207 1.163 60 0.748 0.289 0.156 1.165 60 -0.074 0.140 
Sales CAGR (%) 1.10 11.63 -25.40 44.96 57 -0.856 11.57 -34.85 20.77 59 -1.96 0.365 
Dividends/ Sales 0.009 0.021 0.000 0.079 60 0.008 0.020 0.000 0.074 60 -0.001 0.755 
Ln Total Assets 6.39 1.25 4.25 9.72 60 6.28 1.52 3.33 8.90 60 -0.107 0.673 
Tax/ Sales 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.029 60 0.005 0.012 0.000 0.050 60 0.001 0.675 
Leverage 0.377 0.306 0.000 0.988 60 0.307 0.276 0.000 0.957 60 -0.069 0.197 
ROA -0.060 0.187 -0.840 0.162 60 -0.058 0.183 -0.976 0.170 60 0.002 0.952 
Premium (%) 40.77 50.68 1.60 220.8 60 44.83 29.19 3.75 110.7 60 4.06 0.592 
Analyst Coverage 0.733 0.446 0.000 1.000 60 0.750 0.437 0.000 1.000 60 0.017 0.836 
Competition 0.067 0.252 0.000 1.000 60 0.083 0.279 0.000 1.000 60 0.017 0.732 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                     
** Significant at the 0.05 level           
* Significant at the 0.10 level                     
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4.2 Regression Diagnostics  
In order to perform statistical inference for linear regressions, assumptions on normality for 
the residuals have to be made. However, if the sample size is large enough, the central limit 
theorem implies that the distribution of the residuals follows a normal distribution 
(Wooldridge, 2012). We thus assume normality of our residuals as we consider our sample 
size to satisfy this requirement. Another assumption made by linear regression is that the 
residuals have constant variance. We reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in our 
models, and hence use robust standard errors when conducting our regressions in order to 
mitigate the issue of heteroskedasticity.  
Appendix A.5 and A.6 report pairwise correlation matrixes for all dependent-, independent- 
and control- variables used in our study. We observe a moderate correlation between our 
independent variable and certain of the control variables used in our regressions. If the degree 
of correlation between the variables is large enough, it can cause issues with the interpretation 
of the results. Consequently, we use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to identify the 
potential severity of multicollinearity in our regressions. The VIF checks whether a specific 
variable can be explained by linear combinations of the other independent variables. A more 
detailed explanation of the intuition behind the VIF is provided in appendix A.8. As reported 
in appendix A.8, the low Variance Inflation Factors in both our regressions indicate that our 
analyses do not suffer from multicollinearity issues.  
4.3 Regression Results 
This section presents and discusses our empirical results. We begin by providing a brief 
discussion of the regression specifications. Thereafter the results of each regression-analysis 
and the corresponding hypothesis is discussed. 
4.3.1 Discussion of Regressions Analyses 
As we do not expect the effect of a one dollar increase in a target’s FCF to have the same 
impact on its agency costs of free cash flow regardless of firm size, we have scaled our measure 
of free cash flow by the target’s total assets. Thus, our main variable of interest in all 
regressions is 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
. As the median of 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 in both of the samples used to test hypothesis one and 
two is ~0.06 with standard deviations of ~0.08, we do not find it reasonable to discuss a one 
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unit change in 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
, but rather continue our discussion referring to a 0.01 unit change in the 
measure 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
.  
The variable Tobin’s Q is originally an additional variable of interest in the study of agency 
costs of free cash flow. Contradictory to previous literature, we limit our sample to the segment 
with Tobin’s Q below the sample median. Although the straightforward interpretation of 
Jensen’s theory about the relationship is that the lower the Tobin’s Q of a company, the more 
prone it is to agency costs of free cash flow, and hence the possible value creation by private 
equity firms should be higher, we are not confident that this is the case. It might be that the 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and agency costs of free cash flow is not linear, for instance 
if companies with the lowest Tobin’s Q are more closely monitored as they are closer to 
financial distress. If this is the case, the relationship will not necessarily follow the suggested 
pattern. As we are not in the position to analogously draw Jensen’s (1986) statement to this 
part of our sample, we will not proceed to comment on the coefficients of Tobin’s Q in our 
regressions.  
When reporting the results, we introduce the control variables sequentially. The motivation 
behind this approach is that it enables us to observe whether the coefficient of interest remain 
relatively stable when controls are added. A substantial change in the coefficient indicates that 
a more careful interpretation is required. 
4.3.2 Acquirer Type Regression Results 
The results from the regression analysis used to test our first hypothesis, with bidder type as 
dependent variable, is presented in table 4.3. To obtain our results, we have used our sample 
of matched firms. As a robustness test, a similar regression is performed on the non-matched 
sample of target firms, reported in appendix A.11 and discussed in section 4.4.1.  
The first column (1) of table 4.3 presents our regression model in its simplest form, only 
including our main variable 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
, our growth measure Tobin’s Q and industry fixed effects. 
Further, in column (2), we introduce the group of control variables that might be correlated 
with our main variable. In column (3) we present our main model specification which also 
includes our control variables for analyst coverage and the value of the S&P 500 index.  
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Table 4.3:  
Acquirer type regression results. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer is a 
private equity firm and zero if the acquirer is a public strategic firm. The independent variable (FCF/TA) is 
calculated as our measure of free cash flow divided by the target’s book value of total assets. The remaining 
variables are control variables, and their specification can be found in appendix A.1.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables PE PE PE 
    
FCF/TA 1.545*** 2.136*** 2.174*** 
 (0.560) (0.643) (0.668) 
Tobin’s Q 0.109 0.204 0.216 
 (0.183) (0.189) (0.188) 
Ln Total Assets  -0.0209 -0.0194 
  (0.0419) (0.0464) 
Tax/Sales  2.850 2.890 
  (5.835) (5.823) 
Dividend/Sales  2.529 2.532 
  (2.906) (2.970) 
Leverage  0.283 0.271 
  (0.191) (0.195) 
ROA  -0.463** -0.477** 
  (0.232) (0.231) 
Analyst Coverage   -0.0567 
   (0.113) 
SP500 (/1000)   0.040 
   (0.096) 
Constant 0.275 0.126 0.0895 
 (0.388) (0.430) (0.420) 
    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 120 120 120 
 R-squared 0.066 0.114 0.117 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
From table 4.3, we can see that, in our main regression specification (3), an increase in the 
variable 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 of 0.01 units5 is associated with a 2.17 percentage points higher probability of a 
target getting acquired by a private equity firm rather than a public strategic company, holding 
all other factors constant. The free cash flow coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
on the 1% level for all specifications of the regression model, indicating evidence supporting 
our first hypothesis.  
 
5 According to our model, the likelihood of getting acquired by a PE firm rather than a public strategic bidder is 2.174 times 
higher for a firm with a one-unit higher ratio of 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
. As previously discussed, we refer to a 0.01 unit increase in our main 
variable to make our discussion more intuitive, i.e., an increase in the variable 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 of 0.01 units is associated with a 0.0217 
higher likelihood of getting acquired a private equity firm.  
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By introducing the regression in such a sequential manner, we observe that the coefficient of 
our variable of interest, 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 increases slightly from specification (1) to (2) and remains stable 
in the two last columns. This indicates that the control variables do not impact our main 
variable decisively. If it is the case that the change from specification (1) to (2) is not due to 
the control variables reducing the bias in specification (1), but that it rather is a result of 
correlation between our explanatory variables, this change could be an issue. However, as the 
VIF does not indicate multicollinearity issues, and the coefficient is positive and highly 
significant also without the control variables, we are less concerned about wrongfully rejecting 
the null hypothesis, but limit our potential error to interpreting the effect of the coefficient as 
being more important than it is. By analysing the changing coefficient of 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 further (not 
reported), we observe that the increase is primarily a consequence of adding ROA to the 
regression model. This could be an indicator that we are able to control for the contradictory 
effect that private equity firms also target poorly performing targets. Hence, we interpret the 
significant negative coefficient of ROA to be a natural result of our intentions. Thus, we view 
the results to be an indicator of successfully reducing the omitted variable bias and hence 
increasing the reliability of our main variable.  
Based on this analysis, we believe our results provide evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
targets prone to agency problems of free cash flow has a higher probability of being acquired 
by private equity firms. These results can be viewed as consistent with the relations proposed 
by Jensen (1989) and indicate that the free cash flow hypothesis has impacted private equity 
acquisitions over the recent time period.   
Contrary to the findings of Halpern et al. (1999), we find evidence in favour of our first 
hypothesis. We believe an explanation for the contradiction could be the fact that we limit our 
sample to low growth firms only, while the mentioned study does not impose such a limitation 
on their sample. As previously discussed, Jensen (1986) distinguishes between low and high 
growth firms, and the free cash flow hypothesis describes only low growth firms with high 
free cash flow. If the relationships proposed by Jensen (1986) do not hold for high growth 
firms, the insignificant results of Halpern et al. (1999) could be a consequence of the high 
growth firms disturb the relations we observe for our low growth firm sample. Although it is 
not reported, as we do not believe we have reason to draw any conclusions on the high growth 
section of our sample, we have performed our first regression analysis on our entire sample, 
prior to limiting it to low growth firms. On this sample, we observe that the relation found in 
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our main analysis is weaker. This indicates the importance of constraining our sample in order 
to obtain reliable results for the studied relation.   
An additional possible explanation for our contradicting findings compared to the previous 
literature could be that our analysis compares targets acquired by private equity firms to targets 
acquired public strategic bidders, while Halpern et al. (1999) compare private equity targets 
to targets acquired by a non-private equity firm. If their group of non-private equity acquirers 
can implement the same solution as private equity firms to a greater extent than our group of 
public strategic bidders, their free cash flow coefficient might not be able to capture the 
intended effect and hence be insignificant. Although the studies conducted by Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) and Opler and Titman (1993) are not performed on directly comparable 
samples, we believe it is interesting to observe that the relationships found in their studies of 
LBO targets compared to firms that are not being acquired yields similar results as our study.  
4.3.3 Acquisition Premium Regression Results 
The regression results from the second regression with acquisition premium as the dependent 
variable is presented in table 4.4. To obtain our results, we have used our sample of 
transactions where the acquirer is a private equity firm only.  
As with our first regression, we introduce the model sequentially in order to be able to interpret 
the coefficient with higher certainty. We begin by presenting the model in its simplest form, 
only including our main variable of interest 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
, our growth measure Tobin’s Q and industry 
fixed effects in column (1). We subsequently add the control variables that might be correlated 
with our main explanatory variable in column (2). In column (3) we achieve our main model 
specification when we add the control variables analyst coverage, competition and the value 
of the S&P 500 index.  
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Table 4.4:  
Acquisition premium regression results. The dependent variable is the acquisition premium, calculated as the 
difference between the offer price and the target closing stock price four weeks before the announcement of the 
acquisition, expressed as a percentage. The independent variable (FCF/TA) is calculated as our measure of free 
cash flow divided by the target’s book value of total assets. The remaining variables are control variables, and 
their specification can be found in appendix A.1.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Premium Premium Premium 
    
FCF/TA 134.1** 154.4*** 142.0*** 
 (54.10) (54.75) (52.58) 
Tobin’s Q -53.12** -18.59 -3.641 
 (25.28) (18.67) (17.41) 
Ln Total Assets  -13.45*** -11.73** 
  (4.437) (4.664) 
Tax/Sales  126.3 207.3 
  (825.4) (706.9) 
Dividend/Sales  227.9 293.6 
  (208.9) (213.5) 
Leverage  58.54** 51.94** 
  (22.27) (19.77) 
ROA  -106.7*** -89.33*** 
  (30.26) (30.73) 
Analyst Coverage   -4.121 
   (8.840) 
SP500   0.00571 
   (0.00744) 
Competition   58.54** 
   (25.29) 
Constant 81.64*** 59.02** 37.38 
 (28.44) (27.63) (22.26) 
    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 65 63 63 
R-squared 0.124 0.543 0.625 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
From table 4.4, we can see that, in our main regression specification (3), an increase in the 
variable 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 of 0.01 units is associated with a 1.42 percentage points, i.e.142 basis points, 
higher acquisition premium (which is measured as a percentage of the stock price before 
announcement)6. This coefficient of our main variable is statistically significant at the 1% 
 
6 According to our model, a one-unit increase 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 is associated with a 142 percentage points higher acquisition premium. As 
previously discussed, we refer to a 0.01 unit increase in our main variable to make our discussion more intuitive, i.e., an 
increase in the variable 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 of 0.01 units is associated with a 1.42 percentage points higher acquisition premium. 
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level, indicating support for our second hypothesis. To place this in economic perspective, the 
median acquisition premium for the private equity sample with low growth (the sample used 
for this regression) is 26.35% with a standard deviation of 42.64 percentage points.  
Through the sequential introduction of the control variables, we observe that the coefficient 
of our main variable is significant and relatively stable in all three columns, indicating a 
reasonably reliable effect and magnitude. The change from column (1) to (2) is, as in our other 
regression, mainly a consequence of introducing ROA to the regression model. The same 
discussion presented in section 4.3.2 is relevant in this section. As in our previous analysis, 
we interpret the significant negative coefficient as a sign that we have succeeded in our 
intentions to control for the contradictory effect that private equity firms target poorly 
performing targets. These results indicate that we have obtained a reliable coefficient of 
interest.  
The R-squared increases considerably from (1) to (2) when adding the control variables, 
indicating that they explain a considerable amount of the variation in the acquisition premium. 
In our primary model specification (3), the R-squared is 0.63, indicating that the model fit our 
data set well.  
From this analysis it seems reasonable to conclude that our second hypothesis is likely to hold, 
specifically that private equity firms pay a higher acquisition premium for targets prone to 
agency costs of free cash flow. We view these results to be in line with the relationships 
proposed by Jensen (1989). In addition, the findings indicate a relevancy of the free cash flow 
hypothesis. 
The results from our analysis are in line with the ones of Lehn and Poulsen (1989). However, 
our findings are contrary to those of Halpern et al. (1999) when analysing the acquisition 
premium paid by private equity firms in relation to the free cash flow hypothesis. Similarly to 
the discussion presented earlier, these contradictory findings could be a result of limiting our 
sample to low growth firms. We have therefore performed our second regression analysis on 
our entire sample of private equity acquisitions, prior to limiting it to low growth firms (not 
reported). On this sample, we do, in line with Halpern et al. (1999), not find support for our 
hypothesis.  
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4.4 Robustness Checks  
The following section contains a presentation of the robustness checks which demonstrates 
the sensitivity of our regression models. The regression tables are reported in appendix A.9 
through A.13. Unless otherwise specified, all robustness checks are performed on our main 
regression specifications, presented in column (3) of table 4.3 and 4.4.  
4.4.1 Robustness of Acquirer Type Regression Model 
Alternatives to our Main Variable of Interest 
We test the robustness of the acquirer type regression results to alternative scaling factors for 
our free cash flow measure and report the outcomes in column (1) and (2) of table A.9. Column 
(1) shows a positive coefficient of interest, significant at the 1% level, when the target’s market 
value of equity is used as scaling factor. The magnitude of the coefficient is lower than the 
one reported in our main model. As a potential consequence of limiting our sample to low 
growth firms only, the median of 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑀𝑉𝐸
 is approximately twice the size of the median of 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
, 
meaning the target’s market value of equity on average is smaller than the corresponding total 
assets. This could be an explanation for why a one unit increase in 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑀𝑉𝐸
 has a smaller impact 
on the dependent variable when compared to a one unit increase in 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
. Further, column (2) 
provides the results of our acquirer type regressions when scaling our free cash flow measure 
by the target’s net sales. The results reveal a positive coefficient of interest, significant at the 
1% level. These findings indicate that our initially reported results are not sensitive to the 
choice of scaling factor for our free cash flow measure.  
Column (3) of the same table shows the results of our acquirer type regression when we, in 
line with Lang et al. (1991), include the target’s reported operating cash flow as an alternative 
to our measure of free cash flow. As reported, the coefficient of the operating cash flow 
variable is positive and significant at the 10% level. We therefore interpret the results as 
indications supporting our hypothesis and primary findings. Naturally, as the two cash flow 
measures are not calculated identically and include different accounting items, the magnitude 
of the coefficients are not directly comparable. In addition, as previously discussed, the 
operating cash flow is not directly comparable to our measure of free cash flow as it does not 
account for distributions to stakeholders.  
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Alternative Measure of Time Varying Fixed Effects 
We observe that our initial results seem robust also when including year fixed effects as an 
alternative to the S&P 500 index, reported in column (4) of table A.9. The coefficient of the 
variable of interest is significant at the 1% level and enters with a positive sign. The fact that 
we do not observe significant changes in any of the coefficients in the regression when 
introducing the year fixed effects indicates that our initial results are not sensitive to 
controlling for time varying effects. 
Alternative Proxy for Growth Opportunities  
To ensure our analysis is not biased by the weaknesses of our measure of growth opportunities, 
Tobin’s Q, we report the results of our acquirer type regressions preformed on a sample limited 
to target firms with three-year CAGR of sales as a substitute for Tobin’s Q in table A.10. We 
report all regression specifications from section 4.3.2 in addition to the specification including 
year fixed effects discussed above. As a substantial amount of the target firms are not the same 
as in our main sample, the matching procedure is repeated in order to ensure that the results 
are reliable. This leaves us with a new balanced sample consisting of 112 transactions, 56 pairs 
of target firms. Based on the results, it appears that the relationships in hypothesis one is 
supported as well, when using the three-year CAGR of sales as our proxy for growth 
opportunities. Although the coefficients of our main variable of interest 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
 are lower than in 
our main regression model, it still enters with a positive and significant coefficient in all 
regression specifications. Furthermore, as our regressions are performed on a relatively small 
number of observations and a substantial part of this sample consists of target firms not 
included in our main analysis, we are not surprised to see unidentical coefficients. Instead we 
interpret the results as an indication that our model is robust also for a different sample set of 
observations. We also view the substantial change in targets included in our analysis as an 
indicator of a substantial sensitivity to the chosen proxy for future growth opportunities, and 
thereby the importance of this robustness check. 
Regression Performed on Unmatched Sample 
In order to test whether the findings reported is a result of our matching procedure, we report 
the same analysis on the unmatched sample in table A.11. The results of these tests indicate 
the same relationships as in our main regression model. The coefficient on our main variable 
is positive and significant at the 5% level. Further, both the sign and the significance of the 
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control variables are similar to those reported in the results section. This provides evidence 
that our initial results are not drawn based on matching of incomparable transactions. 
To summarise, the robustness tests performed on our acquirer type regression indicate that the 
results initially found are reliable and that the conclusions drawn are likely to hold. The 
robustness tests hence support that targets prone to agency costs of free cash flow have a higher 
likelihood of being acquired by a private equity firm rather than a public strategic bidder.  
4.4.2 Robustness of Acquisition Premium Regression Model 
Alternatives to our Main Variable of Interest 
As with our first hypothesis, we test the robustness of the acquisition premium regression 
results to alternative scaling factors for our free cash flow measure and report the outcomes in 
column (1) and (2) of table A.12. Column (1) shows a positive coefficient of interest, 
significant at the 1% level, when scaling our free cash flow measure by the target’s market 
value of equity. Similar to the robustness checks reported in section 4.4.1, the coefficient of 
interest is lower than the one reported in our initial results. As previously discussed, this could 
be a natural result of the different sizes of the scaling factor. Colum (2) reports a positive, but 
insignificant coefficient when the target’s net sales is used as scaling factors. Although both 
coefficients are positive, the insignificant coefficient of 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 indicates that we might not be 
able to interpret the findings of our main analysis with certainty.  
Column (3) of the same table shows the results of our acquirer type regression when including 
the target’s reported operating cash flow as an alternative to our measure of free cash flow. As 
reported, the coefficient of the operating cash flow variable is positive, but insignificant, 
indicating that our results might not be supported. However, we again want to underline that 
this measure does not account for distributions to stakeholders. 
Alternative Measure of Time Varying Fixed Effects 
When controlling for year fixed effects in column (4), the magnitude of the coefficient 
decreases relative to the main model specification, and the p-value is only 0.16. As this is not 
the case when controlling for time trends (not reported, but which yields results similar to the 
main model in column (3) table 4.4), it appears that our variable of interest, 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝐴
, in our main 
regression model captures effects related to changes in our dependent variable which are not 
captured by the S&P 500 index. Examples of such effects could be trends, political changes 
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and legislation changes which affect the private equity market differently than the rest of the 
market. On the other side, as mentioned in the variables section, it is not certain that grouping 
our transactions by year is the optimal categorising to control for time varying effects, as 
economic changes is not likely to be limited to a given year. In addition, adding time fixed 
effects to our regression model reduces the number of degrees of freedom further. As our 
dataset is already relatively small, the reduction in degrees of freedom makes it difficult to 
obtain reliable results and could be an explanation for the decrease in significance of our main 
coefficient.  
Alternative Proxy for Growth Opportunities 
To test the robustness of our analysis to the sample limitation based on Tobin’s Q, we show 
the results of our acquisition premium regressions preformed on a sample limited to target 
firms with three-year CAGR of sales as a substitute for Tobin’s Q in table A.13. We report all 
regression specifications from section 4.3.3 in addition to the specification including year 
fixed effects discussed above. The results from table A.13 indicate that the relationships 
discussed in hypothesis two are also supported when using the three-year CAGR of sales as 
our proxy for growth opportunities. Surprisingly, and contrary to our initial findings, we 
observe that the relationships are still supported when controlling for time fixed effects. 
Although the coefficients are smaller than in our initial main regression model, the main 
variable of interest enters with a positive and significant coefficient in our main regression 
specification. Furthermore, as our regressions are performed on a relatively small number of 
observations and a substantial part of this sample consists of transactions not included in our 
main analysis, we are not surprised to see unidentical coefficients. The change of proxy does 
not either seem to change the sign or significance of our control variables substantially. We 
believe this analysis provides evidence in line with the relationships discussed in section 4.3.3.  
Alternative Robustness Check  
An additional interesting robustness check could have been to control for firm-specific fixed 
effects related to the acquiring firm. As some private equity firms in our sample undertake 
several acquisitions over the time period under review, it might be that our results reflect their 
particular behaviour and preferences. However, there are only seven acquiring private equity 
firms which repeatedly complete transactions in our sample, and hence it would be necessary 
to control for 53 different private equity firms. Thus, including firm fixed effects in addition 
to all our control variables is not feasible as the number of control variables exceeds the 
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number of observations. We did attempt to carry out the analysis excluding industry fixed 
effects, but as this analysis is calculated with only one degree of freedom, we do not consider 
it reliable enough to report. It could however be mentioned that it did yield a positive 
insignificant coefficient for our variable of interest.  
In summary, the relationships between the acquisition premium and the free cash flow 
hypothesis initially found, are not unambiguous in our robustness checks. These findings 
suggest that we cannot be certain that private equity companies pay a higher acquisition 
premium for targets prone to agency problems of free cash flow. Hence, we cannot conclude 
that they have a higher willingness to pay for these targets than the rest of the market. 
4.5 Further Discussion 
This section contains a further discussion of the inconsistent findings of our analyses and 
possible reasons for the outcomes.  
As set out in the previous section, our acquirer type analysis seems to be robust to the 
additional tests, whilst the findings of our acquisition premium analysis are not unambiguous. 
As we did find support for the hypothesis that private equity firms target companies prone to 
agency costs of free cash flow, we assume that private equity firms believe they are able to 
create value by acquiring these targets. However, it does not seem like our additional analyses 
for the acquisition premium regression manages to capture this.  
A likely explanation for this is that the competition in the private equity market is not strong 
enough to push the deal value up to the acquirer’s maximum willingness to pay, and thus the 
premium we observe is not the acquirer’s calculated value creation. This weakness is already 
discussed in our theoretical framework (see section 2.6) and is supported by the observation 
that only four of the 68 transactions in our sample where the acquirer was a private equity firm 
were challenged by a competing bid while the winning bid was pending. Based on this, it 
would perhaps be more interesting to conduct the same analysis on a sample of challenged 
deals only. Unfortunately, as we have a limited amount of challenged deals in our sample, we 
have not been able to perform this analysis. Although we will not report it as we do not view 
results based on four observations to be reliable enough for our thesis, we did attempt to 
perform our analysis also including an interaction term between our variable of interest and 
 50
our competition variable. The results were in line with our expectations, that the free cash flow 
has a much larger impact on the premium for challenged deals. 
Related to this discussion it could be that as private equity firms often attempt to buy 
undervalued targets (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014) they might be less interested in acquiring 
targets where they have competition in the acquisition process, as this naturally increases the 
price. If the rest of the market is not able to match the private equity firms’ ability and desire 
to restructure targets prone to agency costs of free cash flow, it might be that these targets are 
in fact under-priced relative to the valuation of private equity firms. Consequently, our results 
that these targets have a higher probability of being acquired by private equity firms, but that 
they do not necessarily pay more for them, could indicate that, in the market for targets prone 
to agency problems, private equity firms are still able to exploit the opportunity of acquiring 
under-valued targets. 
An additional possible explanation for why this expected value creation is not reflected in the 
acquisition premium is, as also previously discussed, that the market might have forecasted 
the acquisition and that the assumed value creation is thus already incorporated in the share 
price.  
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5. Conclusion 
The following section provides a summary of our research question, methodology and 
findings. We further discuss limitations of the analyses and suggestion for future research on 
the topic. 
5.1 Summary and Conclusion 
Jensen (1986) argues that firms with substantial free cash flow and limited growth 
opportunities are prone to agency costs of free cash flow and states that private equity firms 
have a unique ability to mitigate these agency costs (Jensen, 1989). Based on this statement, 
the research question of this thesis is:  
Do private equity firms target companies prone to agency costs of free cash flow and do 
agency costs of free cash flow in target companies increase private equity firms’ willingness 
to pay, relative to that of the market?  
We apply a measure of the target’s operating income before depreciations, after distributions 
to stakeholders, as a proxy for the free cash flow available for managers to spend on what the 
shareholders view as suboptimal behaviour. Additionally, we limit our sample to contain only 
acquisition targets with low growth, measured as having a Tobin’s Q below the sample 
median. To study the first part of our research question, we apply a matching procedure to 
obtain a balanced sample of 60 targets acquired by private equity firms and 60 targets acquired 
by public strategic companies. We test whether a higher value of our measure of target’s free 
cash flow increases the likelihood of the acquirer being a private equity firm relative to a public 
strategic company. Subsequently, in order to analyse the second part of our research question, 
we use the acquisition premium as a proxy for excess willingness to pay relative to the market. 
On a sample of 63 acquisitions performed by private equity firms, we test whether a higher 
value of the same measure of target’s free cash flow is associated with a higher acquisition 
premium.  
The findings of our main regression models provide significant evidence in favour of both our 
hypotheses, indicating that private equity firms do target companies prone to agency costs of 
free cash flow and that their willingness to pay is greater than the market’s for targets prone 
to these costs. However, in the subsequent analyses, only the first hypothesis seems to be 
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robust, and hence we cannot conclude with a reasonable level of certainty that the implied 
value creation of private equity firms through mitigation of agency costs of free cash flow is 
reflected in their willingness to pay. As discussed, we believe this to be a result of the lack of 
competition in the transactions studied and that consequently, using the acquisition premium 
as a proxy for excess willingness to pay over the market valuation is not allowing us to identify 
the relationship we intend to study. On the other hand, our mixed results indicating that private 
equity companies target firms prone to agency costs of free cash flow, but not necessarily pay 
more for them, may indicate that there are good investment opportunities in the acquisition 
market for firms prone to agency costs of free cash flow.   
5.2 Limitations  
When interpreting the results of our study, one must be aware of certain limitations. The first 
limitation to our analysis is related to the external validity of the results. As Jensen’s (1989) 
statement concerns public companies only and as we expect agency costs of free cash flow to 
be most severe in public companies, we have limited our sample to public targets. Hence, as 
our analysis is performed on public targets only, we cannot generalise the relationships found 
in this study across the entire population of targets acquired by private equity firms. However, 
as the intention of this study is to test the relationships proposed by Jensen (1989), our goal is 
not to identify relationships that can be generalised across both public and private targets 
acquired by private equity firms. Although we do not consider this a weakness to our study, 
we consider it a limitation that the reader should be aware of. Relatedly, a limiting factor 
arising from our review of public targets, is the relatively small sample size.  
Another limitation of this study relates to the use of proxies in our study. Agency costs of free 
cash flow, growth opportunities and maximum willingness to pay are all variables which are 
challenging to measure directly with the data availability we have. Hence, a large part of our 
study relies on proxies. As these proxies will never be perfect measures, we face the risk of 
drawing conclusions based on incorrect measures. For the free cash flow and growth measure, 
we mitigate this issue to some extent by performing robustness tests on the relationships found 
in our main analyses and by controlling for relevant variables. However, for our measure of 
maximum willingness to pay, we believe the lack of competition prevents the acquisition 
premium from serving as a perfect proxy. Unfortunately, as we do not have access to additional 
data on challenged deals, we are not able to improve the weaknesses of the proxy.   
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Related to the challenge with using proxies, a concern could be if we assume a link between 
the independent and dependent variable to be evidence of our hypothesis while it is actually a 
result of private equity firms targeting companies with substantial free cash flow because they 
are more liquid, and hence have a more stable cash flow to pay debt. Additionally, our free 
cash flow measure is calculated based on operating income before depreciation and hence it 
is measured after subtracting operating expenses. Although Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis mainly 
concerns low-return investments, wasteful behaviour by management can also be reflected in 
the operating expenses. However, identifying waste within operating expenses is difficult. 
Ideally such waste should be added to our free cash flow measure, as it might be a part of the 
potential gain by mitigating agency costs of free cash flow.  
Additionally, our analyses are based on the assumption that players in the acquisition market 
make acquisitions based on value creation for their shareholders. Ironically, certain 
acquisitions might be a result of agency costs of free cash flow in the acquiring firm. This 
relation is confirmed in the study of Lang et al. (1991). Due to the alignment of incentives 
between managers and investors in private equity firms, we believe this to be particularly 
applicable to the public strategic bidders in our sample. If this is the case, our results might be 
biased as public strategic bidders could acquire targets which should in theory be acquired by 
private equity firms. 
A final limiting factor to our study concerns the availability of data. Through the development 
of our thesis, there have been certain additional relationships which we believe would have 
been valuable to incorporate in our analyses, but which we have not been able to include due 
to our limited access to relevant databases and the time constraint of this thesis. Firstly, we 
believe including data on managerial shareholdings in our target companies could have yielded 
valuable results as we expect managers of companies with substantial managerial 
shareholdings to have incentives closer aligned with shareholders and hence the agency 
problems between managers and shareholders in these firms to be less severe. Secondly, data 
on the degree of fragmentation of ownership could be used to control for the fact that the 
owners of public companies with concentrated ownership more likely monitor their companies 
more closely which might also lead to less severe agency problems between managers and 
shareholders. Thirdly, we assume access to acquirer characteristics, for instance performance 
fees, could have provided relevant insight which might have added value to our analyses.  
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5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
Building on the research conducted and limitations of this thesis, we would find it interesting 
to further investigate the relationship between agency costs of free cash flow and private equity 
firms’ excess willingness to pay, compared to the market. As we believe the lack of 
competition in our data set prevents us from measuring this relationship when applying the 
acquisition premium as our proxy for excess willingness to pay, a direction for future research 
could be to attempt to obtain more data on challenged deals. More detailed data, which could 
enable a more comprehensive analysis, might also make it easier to identify potential waste in 
operating expenses. We suppose this could be done by obtaining and including detailed data 
which might be available in more advanced M&A databases or through collaboration with 
larger M&A firms. We also think that the access to data form larger M&A firms could make 
it possible to improve the study by including characteristics of private equity acquirers and 
more characteristics on public strategic acquirers in the analysis. An alternative approach to 
alleviate this issue could be to attempt to study private equity firms’ valuation of targets 
directly. 
Another suggestion for further research could be to look at how the relationships between 
public corporations and agency costs of free cash flow have developed over time. Through the 
contribution of Jensen’s theories and further research, the market might have become more 
aware of these potential costs. Further, it could be hypothesised that recent technological 
development and increasing reporting requirements in respect of governance have made it 
easier for the market to more closely monitor companies, making it more challenging for 
managers not to act in the interests of shareholders. Thus, the possible value creation of private 
equity firms arising from mitigating agency costs of free cash flow might not be as prevalent 
today as before.  
Considering the ongoing debate in Norway regarding the large unprofitable foreign 
investments made by major corporations like Equinor, Telenor, Hydro and Statkraft over 
recent years (Langved et al., 2019), a relevant and exciting topic for a subsequent paper would 
be to study agency costs of free cash flow in such corporations where there is substantial 
national government ownership. The Norwegian media has criticised the government for not 
being sufficiently active in relation to these investments and the requirements for effective and 
profitable use of capital. In our view, large unprofitable foreign investments in profitable 
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companies with weak corporate governance could be an indicator of empire building and 
agency costs of free cash flow.  
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Kaplan, S., and Strömberg, P. (2009). Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 24 (2): 217-254.  
 
Kieschnick, R. (1989) “Management Buyouts of Public Corporations: An Analysis of Prior  
Characteristics” in Y. Amihud (ed.), Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and  
Consequences, Dow Jones-Irwin, Homewood, IL.  
 
Krishnaswamy, C. R. (2009). An Analysis of the Performance of Private Equity: Agency Cost 
Approach. Corporate Ownership & Control, 6 (3): 424-428. 
 
Lang, L., Stulz, R., and Walkling, R. (1991). A test of the free cash flow hypothesis. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 29 (2): 315-335.  
 
Langved, Å., Riisnæs, I. G., and Klevstrand, A. (2019). Godtroende styremedlemmer noe  
avårsaken til Equinors tap i utlandet, mener riksrevisoren. Dagens Næringsliv. 
Retrieved from: https://www.dn.no/marked/riksrevisjonen/equinor/naringsdeparteme
ntet/godtroende-styremedlemmer-noe-av-arsaken-til-equinors-tap-i-utlandet-mener-
riksrevisoren/2-1-715461 
 
Lehn, K., Netter, J. and Poulsen, A. (1990). Consolidating corporate control: Dual-class 
recapitalizations versus leveraged buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics, 27 (2): 
557-580.  
 
Lehn, K., and Poulsen, A. (1989). Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private 
Transactions. The Journal of Finance, 44 (3): 771-787.  
 
Loderer, C., and Martin, K. (1990). Corporate Acquisitions by Listed Firms: The Experience  
of a Comprehensive Sample. Financial Management, 19 (4): 17-33 
 59 
Murphy, K. J. (1985). Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical 
Analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7: 11-41 
 
Opler, T. and Titman, S. (1993). The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity: Free Cash 
Flow vs. Financial Distress Costs. The Journal of Finance, 48 (5): 1985-1999.  
 
Rappaport, A. (1990). The Staying Power of the Public Corporation. Harvard Business Review  
68: 96-104.  
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2016). Introductory Econometrics. 6th edition. Cengage Learning.  
 
 
 60
Appendix 
Appendix A.1: Variable Definitions  
Variable  Description Further description and calculation 
      
PE Private equity firm A dummy equal to one if the acquirer is a private equity 
firm and zero if the acquirer is a public strategic firm.  
      
Premium Acquisition premium  𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒−𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑐𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑐𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
  
      
FCF Proxy for Jensen's free cash flow Operating income before depreciation - Cash payments 
for income taxes - Cash payments to finance short and 
long term debt - Cash dividend to common and preferred 
stock 
      
FCF/TA Our free cash flow measure  𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
      
FCF/MVE Alternative free cash flow 
measure 
 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
  
      
FCF/Sales Alternative free cash flow 
measure 
 𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
  
      
OCF/TA Alternate cash flow measure  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
    
 
Tobin's Q Proxy for growth opportunities  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
    
 
Sales growth  Proxy for growth opportunities: 
Three-year compounded annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of sales  
(
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡=−1
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡=−3
)
1
2 − 1  
 
Ln Total Assets Measure for firm size Measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of 
the target’s total assets 
   
Dividend/Sales Dividend 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
  
      
Tax/Sales Tax payable Target′s income tax payable 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
  
      
Leverage Leverage  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡+𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
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Analyst 
Coverage 
Analyst coverage of target A dummy variable equal to one if the target is followed 
by at least one analyst prior to the acquisition and zero 
otherwise 
      
ROA Return on assets Target's net income divided by the book value of total 
assets 
      
Target SIC code Target's SIC code Categorical variable equal to one if the first digit of the 
target's SIC code is within the given group 
      
SP500 S&P 500 index The value of the index S&P 500 at the deal 
announcement date.  
      
Year Year of the transaction Categorical variable equal to one if the year of the 
transaction is within the given year 
      
MVE Market value of equity Target's stock price times the numbers of shares 
outstanding four weeks prior to the announcement of the 
acquisition 
      
Competition Bidding competition A dummy variable equal to one if a third party launched 
an offer for the target while this original bid was 
pending. 
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Appendix A.2: Sample Distribution 
Figure A.2 
Sample of low growth target firms by target one-digit SIC code. The figure illustrates the number of acquisitions 
divided by target one-digit SIC code across bidder types.  
 
Appendix A.3: Aggregate Deal Value by Year 
Figure A.3 
Aggregate deal value for the sample of low growth target firms by year. The sample period covers the year of 
2009 through 2018. The figure illustrates the aggregate deal value of private equity acquisitions within each 
year of our sample. 
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Appendix A.4: Matching Procedure 
In order to obtain a balanced sample for our acquirer type regression we have performed a 
nearest-neighbour matching procedure. To limit the bias in our conclusions, it is important 
that the targets acquired by private equity companies and the targets acquired by public 
strategic companies are comparable before adding our free cash flow variable to the 
regression. There is a trade-off between the number of matches obtained, the number of 
variables to match on and the allowed difference between the paired targets in a match. As our 
sample is already relatively small, we have chosen to match on the variables we believe is the 
largest determinants of characteristics which might impact buyer type, except from the free 
cash flow. Similar to Fidrmuc et al. (2012), we have chosen to focus on target industry, target 
firm size and year of the transaction. We measure industry by SIC code and firm size by market 
value of equity. We assume the market value of equity to be a better measure of firm size than 
the transaction value used by Fidrmuc et al. (2012) for two reasons. Firstly, the deal size 
includes the acquisition premium which we know is generally lower for private equity firms 
than public strategic bidders (Bargeron et al., 2008). Hence, matching on deal size might yield 
biased results. Secondly, as our goal is to find targets which are equally likely to be acquired 
by the two bidder groups, the matching variables should be variables which are measured 
previous to the transaction in time in order to capture the likelihood of being acquired by a 
certain group. As the deal value is not measured ex ante, we do not believe it to be a desirable 
matching variable.  
We have also changed the weight placed on the different variables compared to the procedure 
used by Fidrmuc et al. (2012). As we believe a target’s industry to be the factor which affects 
the most aspects of the business and financial numbers, we place the most weight on matching 
on identical SIC codes. We assume the industry to be an important determinant of buyer type 
both directly (the bidder groups tend to buy targets from different sectors) and indirectly 
through affecting financials which might be more desirable for one of the groups. We further 
believe the firm size to be the second most important variable and weight it thereafter. The 
rationale behind this is the mentioned relation that the two groups target firms of different size 
combined with the fact that firm size impact several aspects of both the business and its 
financials. Lastly, we prioritise matching on deal year, which we assume might impact the 
buyer type through time trends.  
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To perform the matching, we construct a model which attempts to match each of the 63 targets 
acquired by private equity companies to a list of 210 targets acquired by public strategic 
bidders, by the presented variables. Each target acquired by a private equity company is only 
allowed to be matched with one target acquired by a public strategic bidder, and the same 
target acquired by a public strategic bidder can only be matched once. Further, the matching 
process is executed 50 times with the companies in random order to ensure that we employ 
the optimal set of matches. Each set of matches is given a score based on manually chosen 
weights for the matching criterion, and lastly, the set with the best match is chosen. 
The final matched sample consists of 60 targets acquired by a private equity firm and 60 
comparable targets acquired by a public strategic firm. Out of them, 25 of the 60 pairs were 
matched on all four digits of their SIC code, nine have a match where the three first digits of 
their SIC codes are identical, 15 targets have identical two-digit SIC codes and 11 were 
matched on the first digit of their SIC code. As the composition of levels for the matching 
variables is complex to illustrate with more than two components, we do not report the 
matching levels for the other variables, but rather report a test of the differences in the resulting 
matched sample. As we can observe, the matching has yielded a balanced sample with the 
largest equalities on the heaviest weighted variables. On a one-digit SIC code level, the groups 
of targets acquired by the different bidders are identical. The p-value of the difference in target 
market value is 0.939, indicating a very small difference. Lastly, none of the differences in 
transaction years are statistically significant at any conventional significance level. We view 
this as evidence of a balanced sample, given that we have chosen the right variables to match 
on.  
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Table A.4:  
Test of differences between groups for the matched sample of low growth firms: Target and transaction 
characteristics. We report mean values and %bias between the groups for the variables used in the matching 
procedure, in addition to t- and p-values. 
  Mean   t-test 
Variable 
Private 
Equity 
Buyer 
Public 
Strategic 
Buyer %bias t-statistic p-value 
One-digit SIC code (1) 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.000 1.000  
One-digit SIC code (2) 0.050 0.050 0.000 0.000 1.000 
One-digit SIC code (3) 0.233 0.233 0.000 0.000 1.000 
One-digit SIC code (4) 0.083 0.083 0.000 0.000 1.000 
One-digit SIC code (5) 0.117 0.117 0.000 0.000 1.000 
One-digit SIC code (6) 0.067 0.067 0.000 0.000 1.000 
One-digit SIC code (7) 0.317 0.317 0.000 0.000 1.000 
One-digit SIC code (8) 0.117 0.117 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Market Value of Equity 555.1 568.9 -1.40 -0.080 0.939 
Year 2009 0.083 0.050 13.30 0.730 0.468 
Year 2010 0.133 0.133 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Year 2011 0.117 0.083 11.00 0.600 0.547 
Year 2012 0.050 0.067 -7.10 -0.390 0.700 
Year 2013 0.117 0.183 -18.60 -1.020 0.311 
Year 2014 0.033 0.017 10.60 0.580 0.563 
Year 2015 0.050 0.117 -24.10 -1.320 0.189 
Year 2016 0.200 0.167 8.60 0.470 0.640 
Year 2017 0.117 0.117 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Year 2018 0.100 0.067 12.000 0.660 0.513 
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Appendix A.5: Pairwise Correlation Matrix (Matched Acquirer Type Sample) 
Table A.5:  
Pairwise correlation matrix for the sample used in our acquirer type regression. The sample is limited to low 
growth firms only and consists of matched target companies. The specification of all variables can be found in 
appendix A.1. 
  Private 
Equity 
FCF/ 
TA 
FCF/ 
MVE 
FCF/ 
Sales 
OCF/ 
TA 
Tobin's 
Q 
Sales 
CAGR 
(%) 
Dividend/ 
Sales 
Ln 
Total 
Assets 
Tax/ 
Sales 
Leverage ROA Premium 
(%) 
SP500 Analyst 
Coverage 
Private 
Equity 1               
FCF/TA 0,244 1              
FCF/MVE 0,271 0,771 1             
FCF/Sales 0,221 0,790 0,768 1            
OCF/TA 0,153 0,562 0,474 0,479 1           
Tobin's Q 0,136 0,352 0,129 0,152 0,156 1          
Sales 
CAGR 
(%) 0,085 0,329 0,283 0,283 0,213 0,105 1         
Dividend/ 
Sales 0,029 -0,119 -0,004 0,047 0,260 -0,097 -0,266 1        
Ln Total 
Assets 0,039 0,223 0,374 0,357 0,195 -0,067 0,188 0,210 1       
Tax/ Sales -0,039 -0,305 -0,197 -0,280 0,083 -0,199 -0,094 0,323 0,087 1      
Leverage 0,119 0,065 0,389 0,228 0,041 -0,192 0,073 0,081 0,442 -0,028 1     
ROA  -0,006 0,444 0,324 0,465 0,546 0,222 0,184 0,160 0,317 0,037 0,023 1    
Premium 
(%) -0,049 -0,035 0,171 -0,116 -0,070 -0,174 -0,065 -0,057 -0,221 -0,069 0,174 -0,462 1   
SP500 0,007 -0,098 -0,114 -0,106 -0,107 -0,048 0,147 -0,018 0,328 0,048 0,195 0,026 -0,163 1  
Analyst 
Coverage -0,019 0,038 0,076 0,024 -0,053 0,137 0,125 0,009 0,288 0,025 0,045 0,027 -0,061 0,259 1 
  
Appendix A.6: Pairwise Correlation Matrix (Acquisition Premium Sample) 
Table A.6:  
Pairwise correlation matrix for the sample used in our acquisition premium regression. The sample is limited to 
low growth firms only and consists of target companies acquired by private equity firms. The specification of all 
variables can be found in appendix A.1.  
  Premium 
(%) 
FCF/ 
TA 
FCF/ 
MVE 
FCF/ 
Sales 
OCF/ 
TA 
Tobin's 
Q 
Sales 
CAGR 
(%) 
Dividend/ 
Sales 
Ln 
Total 
Assets 
Tax/ 
Sales 
Leverage ROA  SP500 Analyst 
Coverage 
Competition 
Premium 
(%) 1               
FCF/TA 0,130 1              
FCF/MVE 0,327 0,698 1             
FCF/Sales 0,008 0,766 0,697 1            
OCF/TA 0,142 0,570 0,499 0,481 1           
Tobin's Q -0,176 0,380 0,116 0,228 0,387 1          
Sales 
CAGR (%) -0,042 -0,333 -0,185 -0,090 -0,253 -0,002 1         
Dividend/ 
Sales -0,049 -0,169 -0,068 -0,101 0,289 -0,089 -0,185 1        
Ln Total 
Assets -0,298 0,074 0,173 0,222 -0,057 -0,109 -0,015 0,107 1       
Tax/Sales -0,030 -0,285 -0,062 -0,154 -0,275 -0,335 -0,126 0,155 0,188 1      
Leverage 0,213 -0,083 0,323 0,108 -0,117 -0,155 0,172 -0,127 0,334 0,054 1     
ROA -0,493 0,202 0,051 0,209 0,177 0,406 -0,200 0,151 0,178 -0,074 -0,058 1    
SP500 -0,066 -0,048 -0,054 0,089 -0,113 -0,061 0,263 -0,004 0,256 0,147 0,066 0,096 1   
Analyst 
Coverage -0,127 -0,085 -0,101 -0,022 0,022 0,052 0,168 0,124 0,257 0,056 -0,039 0,069 0,145 1  
Competition 0,526 -0,037 -0,063 -0,084 0,078 -0,280 -0,026 -0,119 -0,204 0,016 0,063 -0,371 -0,022 0,024 1 
 
 67 
Appendix A.7: Summary Statistics Prior to Limiting the Sample Only to Low Growth 
Firms.   
Table A.7 
Summary statistics table for our entire dataset prior to limiting the sample to low growth target firms: Target 
and transaction characteristics. We report mean values and standard deviations for all characteristics, as well 
as differences in means for the reported characteristics across the two bidder groups. The date of financials from 
SDC is used as the primary date to collect financial information from the other databases. The specification of 
all variables can be found in appendix A.1. 
  Private Equity Buyer Public Strategic Buyer  Public strategic - PE              
  Mean St.dev Min Max N Mean St.dev Min Max N Diff.  
p-
value 
FCF/TA 0.070 0.106 -0.215 0.449 122 0.043 0.099 -0.215 0.391 472 -0.027*** 0.008 
FCF/MVE 0.103 0.144 -0.231 0.441 122 0.044 0.139 -0.348 0.302 472 -0.059*** 0.000 
FCF/Sales 0.069 0.117 -0.261 0.264 119 0.052 0.131 -0.306 0.274 460 -0.016 0.223 
OCF/TA 0.095 0.123 -0.418 0.850 133 0.005 0.385 -5.86 0.533 557 -0.091*** 0.007 
Tobin's Q 1.447 0.960 0.207 4.37 134 1.880 2.286 0.044 13.23 551 0.433** 0.032 
Sales CAGR (%) 5.20 14.25 -25.40 115.5 127 7.74 64.58 -190.0 1420 535 2.53 0.661 
Dividends/ Sales 0.009 0.022 0.000 0.085 130 0.013 0.032 -0.001 0.130 531 0.004 0.214 
Ln Total Assets 5.97 1.38 2.87 9.72 134 5.85 1.66 0.39 10.27 560 -0.119 0.443 
Tax/ Sales 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.017 127 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.018 508 -0.000 0.517 
Leverage 0.249 0.283 0.000 0.988 134 0.208 0.249 0.000 0.995 551 -0.041* 0.100 
ROA -0.016 0.193 -0.840 1.031 131 -0.037 0.752 -9.522 11.837 548 -0.021 0.754 
Premium (%) 30.75 25.47 -4.65 100 135 46.55 32.83 4.57 126.9 565 15.79*** 0.000 
Analyst Coverage 0.733 0.444 0.000 1.000 135 0.735 0.442 0.000 1.000 565 0.001 0.978 
Competition 0.044 0.207 0.000 1.000 135 0.051 0.221 0.000 1.000 565 0.007 0.742 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level                     
** Significant at the 0.05 level           
* Significant at the 0.10 level                     
 
Appendix A.8: Regression Diagnostics 
We check the potential for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). VIF is 
calculated as: 1
1−𝑅2
  for each variable. The intuition behind the VIF is that when 𝑅2 is large, it 
means that a large amount of the sample variation in a 𝑥𝑗 can be explained by the other 
independent variables in the regression model, and followingly this means that 𝑥𝑗 has a strong 
linear relationships to the other independent variables. Values that exceeds 10 are regarded as 
indicated multicollinearity and calls for an investigation of the data (Wooldridge, 2012). Other 
researchers find that a VIF equal 10 is too high and supports the idea that anything above 2,5 
should be investigated. The results of our VIF indicates no evidence of multicollinearity. The 
high VIF factors for the industry fixed effect dummies is likely due to the small proportion of 
observations in the reference category. We don’t consider the large VIF factors a problem as 
these categorical variables are not the variables of interest.  
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Table A.8:  
VIF for the main model specifications of the acquirer type and the acquisition premium regressions. In column 
(1) the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer is a private equity firm and zero if 
the acquirer is a public strategic firm. In column (2) the dependent variable is the acquisition premium. The 
specification of the independent- and control- variables can be found in appendix A.1.  
 (1)  (2)  
 PE  Premium  
 b/t vif b/t vif 
FCF/TA 2.174** 1.71 142.0** 1.55 
 (3.25)  (2.70)  
Tobin’s Q 0.216 1.37 -3.641 1.75 
 (1.15)  (-0.21)  
Ln Total Assets 2.532 1.35 -11.73* 1.73 
 (0.85)  (-2.51)  
Tax/Sales -0.0194 1.89 207.3 1.35 
 (-0.42)  (0.29)  
Dividend/Sales 0.271 1.56 293.6 1.34 
 (1.39)  (1.37)  
Leverage 2.890 1.31 51.94* 1.40 
 (0.50)  (2.63)  
ROA -0.477* 1.49 -89.33** 1.56 
 (-2.06)  (-2.91)  
Analyst Coverage -0.0567 1.22 -4.121 1.23 
 (-0.50)  (-0.47)  
SP500 0.0000398 1.28 0.00571 1.25 
 (0.41)  (0.77)  
Competition   58.54* 1.39 
   (2.32)  
_cons 0.0895  37.38  
 (0.21)  (1.68)  
     
Industry FE Yes  Yes  
N 120  63  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A.9: Robustness Tests for the Acquirer Type Regression (alternative proxies 
for agency costs of free cash flow and time varying effects) 
Table A.9:  
Robustness tests for the acquirer type regression (alternative proxies for agency cost of free cash flow and time 
varying effects). The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer is a private equity firm 
and zero if the acquirer is a public strategic firm. The specification of the independent- and control- variables 
can be found in appendix A.1.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables PE PE PE PE 
     
FCF/MVE 0.597***    
 (0.159)    
FCF/Sales  1.046***   
  (0.338)   
OCF/TA   0.848*  
   (0.460)  
FCF/TA    2.124*** 
    (0.747) 
Tobin’s Q 0.300* 0.343* 0.331* 0.278 
 (0.181) (0.182) (0.188) (0.205) 
Ln Total Assets -0.0255 -0.0254 0.00298 -0.0319 
 (0.0464) (0.0478) (0.0462) (0.0487) 
Tax/Sales 2.009 3.727 -1.493 2.344 
 (5.601) (6.643) (6.087) (6.627) 
Dividends/Sales 1.655 1.426 0.465 3.305 
 (2.863) (2.988) (2.797) (3.154) 
Leverage 0.0751 0.203 0.273 0.255 
 (0.212) (0.200) (0.196) (0.206) 
ROA -0.396* -0.490* -0.440 -0.420* 
 (0.227) (0.263) (0.293) (0.242) 
Analyst Coverage -0.0786 -0.0539 -0.0485 -0.0272 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.120) (0.119) 
SP500 (/1000) 0.080 0.053 0.017  
 (0.100) (0.098) (0.102)  
Constant 0.151 0.152 0.0302 0.291 
 (0.435) (0.415) (0.387) (0.468) 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.121 0.107 0.080 0.157 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A.10: Robustness Tests for the Acquirer Type Regression (alternative proxy 
for growth opportunities) 
Table A.10:  
Robustness tests for the acquirer type regression performed on our sample of low growth firms proxied by tree-
year CAGR of sales (alternative proxy for growth opportunities). The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the acquirer is a private equity firm and zero if the acquirer is a public strategic firm. The 
specification of the independent- and control- variables can be found in appendix A.1.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables PE PE PE PE 
     
FCF/TA 1.031** 1.140* 1.193** 1.171** 
 (0.490) (0.583) (0.559) (0.564) 
Tobin’s Q 0.00558 0.0270 0.0285 0.0467 
 (0.0697) (0.0701) (0.0682) (0.0677) 
Ln Total Assets  -0.0233 -0.0110 -0.0109 
  (0.0451) (0.0489) (0.0484) 
Tax/Sales  2.409 1.956 0.500 
  (8.657) (8.320) (9.341) 
Dividend/Sales  1.941 1.910 1.871 
  (1.779) (1.887) (2.094) 
Leverage  0.517*** 0.449** 0.417** 
  (0.186) (0.192) (0.197) 
ROA  0.0868 -0.00219 -0.0647 
  (0.272) (0.273) (0.279) 
AC   -0.163 -0.135 
   (0.119) (0.125) 
SP500 (/1000)   0.0783  
   (0.104)  
Constant 0.460*** 0.386 0.274 0.413 
 (0.156) (0.301) (0.318) (0.367) 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes 
Observations 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.044 0.115 0.138 0.208 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A.11: Robustness Tests for the Acquirer Type Regression (performed on 
unmatched sample)  
Table A.11:  
Robustness tests for the acquirer type regression performed on unmatched sample of low growth firms. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer is a private equity firm and zero if the 
acquirer is a public strategic firm. The specification of the independent- and control- variables can be found in 
appendix A.1.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables PE PE PE PE 
     
FCF/TA 0.369 0.895** 0.886** 0.930** 
 (0.289) (0.375) (0.382) (0.390) 
Tobin’s Q 0.140 0.186* 0.195* 0.211** 
 (0.0944) (0.0981) (0.101) (0.103) 
Ln Total Assets  0.00528 0.00920 0.00438 
  (0.0159) (0.0182) (0.0193) 
Tax/Sales  8.507 8.605 8.828 
  (5.465) (5.499) (5.606) 
Dividend/Sales  -0.378 -0.372 -0.428 
  (0.913) (0.935) (0.957) 
Leverage  0.280** 0.278** 0.275** 
  (0.108) (0.108) (0.110) 
ROA  -0.438** -0.446*** -0.420** 
  (0.170) (0.169) (0.180) 
AC   -0.0223 -0.0252 
   (0.0616) (0.0625) 
SP500 (/1000)   -0.0089  
   (0.0483)  
Constant 0.268 0.134 0.138 0.167 
 (0.243) (0.266) (0.269) (0.290) 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes 
Observations 306 275 275 275 
R-squared 0.064 0.122 0.122 0.134 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A.12: Robustness Tests for the Acquisition Premium Regression (alternative 
proxies for agency costs of free cash flow and time varying effects). 
Table A.12:  
Robustness tests for the acquisition premium regression (alternative proxies for agency costs of free cash flow 
and time varying effects). The dependent variable is the acquisition premium, calculated as the difference 
between the offer price and the target closing stock price four weeks before the announcement of the acquisition, 
expressed as a percentage. The specification of the independent- and control- variables can be found in appendix 
A.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Premium Premium Premium Premium 
     
FCF/MVE 67.90***    
 (19.76)    
FCF/Sales  62.17   
  (41.67)   
OCF/TA   92.09  
   (61.89)  
FCF/TA    87.43 
    (60.19) 
Tobin’s Q 4.910 5.871 -3.552 -5.304 
 (15.44) (18.23) (16.84) (17.95) 
Ln Total Assets -12.51*** -11.59** -11.62** -13.02*** 
 (4.590) (4.940) (4.743) (4.570) 
Tax/Sales -13.58 -30.74 214.4 -441.3 
 (699.6) (705.0) (687.1) (844.9) 
Dividend/Sales 252.0 228.4 46.77 299.9 
 (226.8) (210.1) (233.8) (236.6) 
Leverage 29.93* 47.76** 48.23** 61.10*** 
 (17.01) (20.49) (19.49) (19.79) 
ROA -85.30*** -87.94*** -85.33** -87.22*** 
 (28.42) (31.30) (32.28) (30.34) 
AC -3.705 -5.865 -6.329 -8.943 
 (8.067) (9.522) (9.213) (10.32) 
SP500 0.00964 0.00421 0.00611  
 (0.00751) (0.00765) (0.00752)  
Competition 65.63*** 61.98** 53.60** 50.50** 
 (21.15) (24.66) (20.93) (23.16) 
Constant 35.22* 24.37 25.23 49.77* 
 (20.92) (28.93) (24.24) (28.73) 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes 
Observations 63 63 65 63 
R-squared 0.666 0.593 0.597 0.686 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A.13: Robustness Tests for the Acquisition Premium Regression (alternative 
proxy for growth opportunities). 
Table A.13:  
Robustness tests for the acquisition premium regression performed on our sample of low growth firms proxied 
by tree-year CAGR of sales (alternative proxy for growth opportunities). The dependent variable is the 
acquisition premium, calculated as the difference between the offer price and the target closing stock price four 
weeks before the announcement of the acquisition, expressed as a percentage. The specification of the 
independent- and control- variables can be found in appendix A.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Premium Premium Premium Premium 
     
FCF/TA 52.58 72.80** 75.99** 55.17** 
 (39.95) (34.55) (31.91) (25.15) 
Tobin’s Q -11.75** -5.517 -6.426 -6.185 
 (5.346) (5.494) (5.289) (3.839) 
Ln Total Assets  -7.979** -10.66** -13.70*** 
  (3.848) (4.237) (3.192) 
Tax/Sales  698.3 726.7 403.8 
  (651.6) (562.1) (508.8) 
Dividend/Sales  100.8 128.2 177.7 
  (105.6) (94.30) (127.5) 
Leverage  39.30** 46.09** 41.58*** 
  (17.93) (17.89) (11.49) 
ROA  -49.97*** -46.52*** -41.78*** 
  (13.95) (13.50) (13.57) 
AC   5.831 5.793 
   (6.133) (6.488) 
SP500   0.0133**  
   (0.00577)  
Competition   12.45 25.33 
   (29.11) (16.65) 
Constant 37.18*** 48.11*** 44.13** 81.04*** 
 (3.636) (17.34) (18.29) (24.98) 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes 
Observations 59 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.189 0.471 0.534 0.755 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
